Taye’s vision is to strengthen Amjambo Africa as a trusted platform for thoughtful journalism, connecting the diaspora and global audiences. He plans to expand investigative reporting, highlight African innovation and culture, and amplify authentic voices that are often underrepresented in international media.

Outgoing Editor-in-Chief Kathreen Harrison reflected: “Co-founding and leading Amjambo Africa for the past eight years has been one of the most satisfying experiences of my professional life, and I leave with great memories.”

In an email interview, Taye responded to questions from veteran Amjambo Africa journalist Eloge Willy Kaneza, sharing insights about his journey in journalism, his vision for the publication, and the new directions he hopes to introduce.

READ MORE （ In an email interview ） https://www.amjamboafrica.com/elias-meseret-takes-the-helm-as-editor-in-chief-of-amjambo-africa

To reflect on the progress so far, we asked some of the world’s leading thinkers to spotlight the groundbreaking scientific breakthroughs that have transformed our world since the turn of the millennium.

1. Dream engineering

Until the turn of the last century, psychologists often argued that dreaming was a meaningless experience best confined to the fringes of science. But the 21st century has witnessed a surge of scientific interest in our nocturnal adventures and produced a steady stream of articles exploring the psychology of dreaming.

Some of this work has explored how dreaming can help people process negative emotions and prepare them for challenging events in the real world. Another strand of research has explored the link between dreams and creativity, and has shown that our dreaming minds often come up with new and innovative solutions to pressing problems.

There’s also work that has looked at the social side of dreaming, with psychologists arguing that discussing a dream with others is an effective way of forming and maintaining caring relationships.

Other scientists have taken a different approach and developed techniques that allow them to communicate with people experiencing a lucid dream.

Finally, there’s dream engineering, wherein researchers use smells, sounds and suggestions to manipulate our dreaming minds.

For years, trying to convince scientists to take dreams seriously was a nightmare. Now the tide has turned and we’re starting to uncover the many ways in which dreaming makes a vital contribution to our waking lives.

By Prof Richard Wiseman, Professor of the Public Understanding of Psychology, University of Hertfordshire; Author of Magic Your Mind Happy

2. A new type of stem cell

Before 2006, if researchers wanted to work with human embryonic stem cells, they had to work with human embryos. This was ethically charged territory – the embryos were leftovers from fertility treatments and were destroyed in the process.

Then Prof Shinya Yamanaka from Kyoto University devised a way to make embryonic stem cells without using embryos.

By adding a handful of genes into cultured skin cells and nurturing them with certain nutrients, adult cells could be reprogrammed to become ‘induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells.’

‘Pluripotent’ means that these lab-made stem cells can turn – or ‘differentiate’ – into many other types of cells, including heart cells and neurons.

Now researchers can take cells from an adult animal, turn them into iPS cells and then turn them into the specialised cells of their choice. iPS cells are now routinely used to help test new drugs and therapies, but perhaps their most exciting use is in the field of regenerative medicine.

Imagine a patient with heart disease. Now imagine taking some of their skin cells and using iPS technology to create a pool of healthy heart cells.

The replacement tissue could then be transplanted into the patient’s heart to repair it, and because the cells are the patient’s own, there would be no danger of the tissue being rejected.

The same method could be applied to other conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease and kidney failure, raising the prospect of cures for currently incurable diseases.

Such brilliant, versatile cells… It’s no wonder that Yamanaka received a Nobel Prize in 2012 for his work in their discovery.

By Dr Helen Pilcher, author, speaker and science communication consultant

3. Global heating

Only by looking into the past can we get an inkling of the seriousness of today’s climate predicament.

The terrifying reality is that the global average temperature rise, which is now teetering on the edge of the 1.5°C dangerous climate breakdown guardrail, is occurring 50 times faster than when the world warmed after the Ice Age.

That was 56 million years ago, during the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM).

The episode of rapid heating saw dead, oxygen-depleted oceans and sea levels 50m higher than they are now. And the global temperature today is ramping-up at least ten times faster than during the PETM.

We’re in the middle of a unique climate experiment, continually pumping out 40 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide every year, and hoping that it’ll be fine. I can tell you now, it won’t be.

By Prof Bill McGuire, Professor Emeritus of Geophysical & Climate Hazards, UCL; Author of Hothouse Earth: An Inhabitant’s Guide

4. Attribution analysis

In a nutshell, attribution analysis seeks to determine the extent to which global heating has influenced a particular extreme weather event, such as increasing its intensity or raising its likelihood.

It involves running two computer simulations. One assumes today’s artificially heated climate, the other assumes a pre-industrial climate with all the human influences removed.

Comparison reveals whether global heating had an effect and, if so, what it was. The first-ever attribution analysis determined that the 2003 European heatwave (which claimed 70,000 lives and saw temperatures breach the 37°C/98°F mark for the first time in the UK) was made twice as likely by global heating.

Attribution analysis sheds light on the growing impact global heating is having on our weather patterns, while also loudly undermining the climate deniers – a win all round.

Prof Bill McGuire, Professor Emeritus of Geophysical & Climate Hazards, UCL; Author of Hothouse Earth: An Inhabitant’s Guide

5. mRNA vaccines

The use of mRNA for various medical applications has been in development for decades. It wasn’t until the COVID-19 pandemic that the impact of the technology was first felt, however.

mRNA vaccines allow for the development of vaccines far more quickly than was previously possible – two months for COVID-19 compared to the previous record of four years.

It’s estimated that the COVID-19 mRNA vaccines saved nearly 20 million lives in their first year of use.

In the coming years, we’ll likely have a range of new mRNA vaccines for other viruses that change regularly, like the flu, as well as for viruses that haven’t responded well to previous vaccine technology, like HIV.

By Dr Jeremy Rossman, Honorary Senior Lecturer in Virology, University of Kent

6. The Human Genome Project

In 1990, scientists began to sequence the human genome. It took until 2022 to produce a complete sequence.

This achievement has profoundly changed biomedical science, allowing for research and technology that wouldn’t be possible otherwise, like using CRISPR to modify genetic diseases.

We’re just starting to feel the impact of this achievement on medical practice. By knowing our genome, it’s possible to find changes in genes that are associated with, or even cause, various diseases.

This increases our understanding of those diseases, as well as our ability to diagnose and treat them.

By Dr Jeremy Rossman, Honorary Senior Lecturer in Virology, University of Kent

Read more:

• Nuclear clocks: How ultra-precise measurements will let us probe the Universe like never before

• How close are we to mass-producing humanoid robots?

• 10 of the world’s worst-ever inventions

7. Solving the ‘einstein’ problem

I believe the most important mathematical breakthrough this century is the solution to the long-standing ‘einstein’ (one-stone) problem.

The einstein problem asks whether there is a shape that can tile an infinitely large horizontal surface so that the pattern never repeats.

Brilliant minds had searched for decades for such shapes. Then in 2022, David Smith, a retired print technician and amateur maths enthusiast, began working with software and cardboard cut-outs at his home in Bridlington, Yorkshire.

Smith had worked for years on tiling patterns and had a strong intuition his shape, nicknamed the ‘hat’, would both tile the surface and never repeat.

He didn’t have the mathematical tools to prove his hunch, however, so he turned to the community of tiling enthusiasts and got help from Prof Craig Kaplan at the University of Waterloo, Canada; Prof Chaim Goodman-Strauss from the University of Arkansas; and software engineer Dr Joseph Myers from Cambridge.

Together they came up with computer-based and analytic proofs for a whole family of shapes, and their preprint study was greeted with international acclaim in March 2023 – even though the ‘hat’ occasionally needed to be flipped over to successfully tile the plane.

But no sooner had the preprint of their work been released, than David came up with the ‘spectre’ – a chiral aperiodic monotile, which didn’t need flipping.

Even more impressive, the ‘spectre’ was a member of a larger class of such tiles that allows the straight edges to be wavy.

Again, his colleagues proved the truth of his intuition. This was a beautiful achievement, led by an extraordinary mathematical hobbyist.

By Sir David Spiegelhalter, Emeritus Professor of Statistics, University of Cambridge

8. The cure for HIV

There was a time when HIV was a death sentence. Then anti-retroviral drugs came along and prospects improved. More and more people became able to live with the disease, but a cure still seemed like a distant dream.

Then in 2007, an HIV-positive man called Timothy Ray Brown received a bone marrow transplant for his leukaemia. Chemotherapy had failed and Brown was running out of options.

His doctor, Dr Gero Hütter, thought that the treatment might be able to cure his cancer, but he also realised that if he could find a donor who was genetically resistant to HIV, there was a chance that the same treatment might also cure his HIV.

Some people are naturally HIV-resistant. They carry a mutation in a gene called CCR5, which codes for a receptor protein that HIV uses to enter host cells.

After scouring the register, Hütter found a donor who not only matched Brown’s immune profile, but also carried two copies of the mutated gene.

The transplant went ahead and a few years later, researchers could find no trace of HIV in Brown’s body. Brown came off his anti-retroviral meds and went on to live the rest of his life HIV-free.

He was the first person to be cured of HIV.

Since then, at least six more people with cancer have been cured of HIV using bone marrow transplants.

The treatment, however, is brutal, with risks so great that it’s unlikely ever to become a routine procedure, but it has taught researchers a great deal about HIV and given hope to the world that a cure for HIV will, one day, be possible.

By Dr Helen Pilcher, author, speaker and science communication consultant

9. Transformers and large language models

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has been in the news for more than a decade, largely because one key AI technology – neural networks – finally started to work at scale.

The new AI era was heralded by the advent of ‘deep learning’ around 2005, driven by cheap computer power and plentiful data for ‘training’ neural nets.

The field exploded and we began to see a host of impressive applications. AI hit the headlines.

And then, something unexpected happened. In 2017, a Google team published a scientific paper describing a new architecture for organising neural nets – the so-called ‘transformer architecture.’

The transformer architecture is a neural network architecture for token prediction: taking as input a sequence of tokens (words) and then predicting the next token (word) to appear.

They’re trained by feeding them ordinary human text, and given a ‘prompt’ (for example: ‘a summary of Winston Churchill’s life’). They’ll then try to predict the word most likely to appear next. They do this one word at a time, but the process can be repeated over and over.

It wasn’t obvious in 2017 that transformers would be so… transformative. To realise their full power, you had to be prepared to build them on an unprecedented scale, throw mind-boggling quantities of training data at them and train them with AI supercomputers running for months.

Google didn’t make that bet; it was a little-known organisation called OpenAI, supported by Microsoft. And it paid off, spectacularly.

The first real hint that we were entering a new era was the release of GPT-3 in June 2020. Those with access to OpenAI’s new program seemed genuinely startled by how capable it was.

Just as remarkable for AI researchers was its emergent capabilities: the ability to do things that it wasn’t designed to do.

Questions, like the famous Turing Test, which had been of strictly philosophical interest previously, suddenly became practical experimental questions.

The unprecedented success of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT took Silicon Valley by surprise and now the world’s richest companies are pivoting to try to embed this remarkable new technology everywhere, in the hope that they’ll find the killer application.

For all their success, LLMs aren’t the end of the road for AI; the dream of a helpful household robot that can clear your dinner table and load the dishwasher still seems frustratingly distant.

But the technology is astonishing nonetheless. We’re living at a remarkable time in technological history: our history will be divided into pre-GPT and post-GPT.

By Prof Michael Wolldridge, Ashall Professor of the Foundations of Artificial Intelligence, University of Oxford

10. HPV vaccine

At the turn of the century, scientists knew that cervical cancer was caused by Human Papillomavirus (HPV). Of over 200 known HPV strains, two high-risk types – 16 and 18 – are responsible for over 70 per cent of cervical cancer cases.

While the UK’s cervical screening programme, launched in the 1960s, successfully reduced cervical cancer rates, a huge shift came with the introduction of the HPV vaccine.

The vaccine became part of the UK’s national programme in 2008. Today, it’s licensed in over 100 countries and offered to both girls and boys to prevent HPV-related diseases, including multiple cancers and genital warts.

In the 15 years since its introduction, the vaccine has provided excellent protection against HPV and has delivered remarkable results – an estimated 90-per-cent reduction in cervical cancer rates among women aged 20–30.

The next frontier is achieving the elimination of cervical cancer – something once thought achievable only for infectious diseases – through widespread HPV vaccination and robust screening programmes.

By Dr Michelle Griffin (Director of MFG Health Consulting, clinical leader in the NHS and the World Health Organization)

11. Digital contraception

Non-hormonal digital contraception has revolutionised family planning by combining data-driven insights and user-friendly technology.

Apps like Natural Cycles and Clue empower women to track their menstrual cycles and use the data to prevent or achieve pregnancy, offering a convenient and accessible alternative to traditional contraceptives.

These apps utilise algorithms that analyse patterns in body temperature, ovulation cycles and other physiological markers, providing users with real-time predictions of the fertility window in their cycle.

This innovation marks a turning point in women’s health. In 2018, Natural Cycles became the first digital contraceptive to achieve US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation, elevating the app to a regulated medical intervention.

Natural Cycles reports that the algorithm behind its app has a 93-per-cent success rate, the same as the contraceptive pill. MG

12. Tissue engineering

Going to the dentist and having a synthetic resin filling is fine, but it’s not as good as a real tooth. But what if we could grow real teeth in the lab from a person’s own stem cells and implant them back into their mouth?

This sounds like science fiction, but tissue engineering is a breakthrough technology that’s already being used to grow human tissue, through ‘scaffold technology’. Scaffolds are porous materials that support stem cells as they divide and grow into new tissues.

Artificial ears, trachea (windpipes) and bone have been grown this way and successfully implanted into human patients. Because the implanted tissues are grown from a patient’s own cells, there are no problems with immune rejection.

Artificial kidneys, knee cartilage and even hearts are also being grown this way, although these are still confined to lab experiments. No one can yet put a limit on this new technology, but the successful regrowing of teeth is on the horizon.

By Sir Mark Miodownik (Professor of Materials & Society, UCL; Author of It’s a Gas: The Magnificent and Elusive Elements that Expand Our World)

13. Self-repairing materials

A modern smartphone contains half the elements in the periodic table and yet only has a lifespan of two to three years, on average. To save the massive amounts of energy we’re wasting on continually producing (and even recycling) phones and everything else that fills our lives, we need to find a new way of making products that last longer.

This is where the breakthrough technology of self-repairing materials comes in. Imagine a smartphone that can repair itself overnight when you plug it in.

Many different types of this technology are already on the market. Self-healing paints have room temperature fluidity, allowing them to flow back into cracks and fill the fissure when they form.

Self-repairing concrete for bridges and self-repairing asphalt for roads have already been deployed this century. Self-repairing electronics are coming to help us build a sustainable future. MM

14. Universal programmable chemical robots

What if any chemical reaction could be performed through code? This is what has become possible with the ground-breaking advancement known as chemical computation, or ‘chemputation’.

Chemputation combines automation, computation and modular hardware to transform chemical synthesis into a programmable, universal process. At its core is the ‘chemputer’ – a revolutionary platform capable of executing any feasible chemical synthesis.

It uses a concept known as ‘chempiling’, which translates chemical synthesis pathways into executable hardware configurations – basically acting as a chemical Turing machine. This process digitalises chemistry, increasing efficiency, accelerating research and reducing the risk of human error.

The integration of artificial intelligence into automated synthesis takes this innovation further, enhancing decision-making at every step of the process, from molecule design to reaction execution.

Because of this, chemputation is unlocking immense potential in drug discovery, material science and more.

By Prof Lee Cronin (Regius Professor of Chemistry, University of Glasgow)

15. Dark matter

The majority of the Universe is unseen, composed of two entities called dark matter and dark energy, and physics is currently unable to explain the origin of either.

Over the last 25 years, evidence for the existence of dark matter has become more compelling. Using gravitational effects to deduce where and how much of it there is, we’ve created maps that reveal a pervasive and invisible web.

The patterns seen in these maps, in the cosmic microwave background and in the distribution of galaxies, almost match our expectations for a dark Universe. But while 25 years of looking up has increased astronomers’ confidence, experimentation tells a different story.

After CERN’s 2012 detection of the Higgs boson, there were high hopes that the theoretical ‘lightest supersymmetric particle’ and favourite candidate for dark matter, would be discovered next.

Sadly, the elusive dark matter particle has yet to be found. The lack of detection means that we know what it’s not, even if we don’t yet know what it is. Scientists are working to build the most advanced detector yet, potentially in the UK.

Combined with upgrades at CERN and upcoming observations from the Euclid telescope and Vera Rubin Observatory, the hope is very much alive that it won’t be another 25 years before we understand the dark matter side of the Universe.

By Prof Catherine Heymans (Professor of Astrophysics at the Royal Observatory, University of Edinburgh; Author of The Dark Universe)

16. The Higgs boson particle

If we were to compare the most important discoveries in physics in the first quarter of the 21st century with those of the same period in the 20th, we might feel quite disheartened by the recent paucity of fundamental advances.

Maybe this is because we have largely uncovered the basic laws of the Universe.

It’s certainly hard to deny that those first two or three decades of the previous century were a golden age of physics, from the quantum revolution to Einstein’s two theories of relativity, to the structure of the atom with Ernest Rutherford.

But the theories and experimental discoveries over the past hundred years have still been remarkable, leading to deep insight into the fundamental building blocks of matter, potentially getting us closer to completing the jigsaw puzzle of reality.

One piece of the puzzle that had been missing ever since it was first proposed in the 1960s by Prof Peter Higgs (and others), was the Higgs boson. The particle was proposed as a manifestation of the Higgs field and the Higgs mechanism, explaining how elementary particles acquire mass.

Then, on 4 July 2012, experimental teams working with two giant particle detectors, ATLAS and CMS, at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, announced they had finally observed the Higgs.

It was a landmark achievement in particle physics and a testament to technological innovation in ‘big science’, international collaboration and the human pursuit of knowledge.

It commanded global attention and captivated the wider public.

One might, of course, argue that the discovery of the Higgs wasn’t as profound as, say, the accelerating expansion of the Universe in 1998 (which therefore just misses out on this list), because physicists expected to find the Higgs. But it confirmed a critical component of the Standard Model of particle physics.

The Standard Model is an amalgamation of two separate quantum theories – the electroweak theory and quantum chromodynamics – which together describe the properties of all the known elementary particles and the forces acting between them.

Yet the Standard Model can’t be the final word because it doesn’t include gravity, doesn’t explain dark matter or dark energy, or where all the antimatter that should have been created at the Big Bang has gone.

Fifteen months after the discovery of the Higgs, in October 2013, the Physics Nobel Prize was awarded jointly to Prof François Englert and Prof Peter Higgs, “for the theoretical discovery of a mechanism that contributes to our understanding of the origin of mass of subatomic particles…”

It was awarded not for the experimental confirmation of the Higgs’ existence, but for the original theoretical prediction half a century earlier.

By Prof Jim Al-Khalili (Professor Emeritus in Physics, University of Surrey)

17. The James Webb Space Telescope

Launched aboard an Ariane-5 rocket on Christmas Day 2021, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is nothing short of a technological marvel. Augmenting and improving on the role established by the Hubble Space Telescope, the JWST is designed for infrared astronomy in the wavelength range of 0.6-28.5 microns.

The JWST targets many important areas of astronomy and cosmology, from studying the first stars and initial galaxy formation, to spotting exoplanets and analysing their atmospheres.

A technologically and financially ambitious project, it hit many snags along the way to final deployment. The JWST’s large primary mirror was too large to be carried inside the rocket’s payload bay, for one.

The problem was solved by designing the mirror so that it could fold up for transit and open like the petals of a flower at its destination. That destination needed to be far from any bright radiation sources, such as Earth and the Moon, for JWST’s extremely sensitive infrared detectors to work.

Consequently, its base observation site is located 1.5 million kilometres from Earth, on the opposite side to the Sun. Fortunately, upon its arrival, JWST deployed without incident, which is just as well, because being so distant, there’s little we could have done to fix any problems.

In December 2022, JWST discovered the most distant, and therefore earliest, galaxies ever observed.

A galaxy survey project called JWST’s Advanced Deep Extragalactic Survey looked at an area where Hubble had recorded 10,000 galaxies, and detected a mind-blowing 100,000 galaxies in the same patch of sky.

It’s not just unfathomably distant objects that have had the JWST treatment, though. Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune have all come under JWST’s scrutiny, and spectacular new details about each world have been revealed as a result.

As time goes on, JWST continues to break new ground and its observations are challenging existing theories about object evolution, posing many more questions along the way.

By Pete Lawrence (Astronomer and presenter of BBC Sky at Night)

18. Exoplanets

It makes the night sky far more interesting if we think of every star as being at the centre of a system of planets, like in our Solar System. Of special interest is the possibility that many of those planets are like Earth: the same size and at a distance to their parent star that allows water to exist. Could there be life on them?

Though they were officially discovered in about 1995, most of what we know about exoplanets has come in the last few years.

We’ve now detected over 5,000 of them, mainly with the ‘transit method.’ This is where you don’t actually detect any light from the planets, but the effects on the brightness of a parent star when a planet passes in front of it.

The most successful way we’ve carried out the transit method is by looking through the Kepler Space Telescope. Though the telescope has revealed a lot, it doesn’t tell us about what the surfaces of these planets are like.

For that, you’ve got to detect some light reflected from the planet. That’s much harder and, so far, has only been done for really big planets, not Earth-sized ones. The challenge for the coming 25 years is going to be detecting the light from the Earth-like planets orbiting nearby stars.

The James Webb Space Telescope may do some of this, but a giant ground-based telescope – the Extremely Large Telescope – is being built by a consortium of European countries in Chile. Its mirror is 39m (128ft) across, so it could collect a lot more light from faint objects than the Webb telescope, which is ‘only’ 6.6m (21ft) across.

There’s so much this new area of study could show us. I think if I were talking to a young person embarking on an astronomical career, I would advise focusing on exoplanets. The field is clearly going to be expanding and full of a high rate of discoveries in the coming decades.

By Lord Martin Rees (by Astronomer Royal, Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, University of Cambridge)

19. Gravitational waves

Gravitational waves are significant for two reasons. Firstly, they’re an important physical phenomenon that tells us about the nature of gravity, confirming a further consequence of Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. Secondly, detecting them has been an amazing technical achievement.

The Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) was a huge technical challenge because the expected amplitude of these waves is very small and must be detected at a vast distance. The effect you’re looking for is like the thickness of a hair at the distance of a nearby star. Quite amazing.

Many of us thought that LIGO wouldn’t find anything. Or, if it did, events would be fantastically rare, the instruments only being sensitive enough to detect collisions once a century or so.

But LIGO has been more successful than any of us expected, detecting a pair of black holes about 50 times the mass of the Sun crashing together within a short time of being switched on.

It was amazingly exciting and it’s now detecting about one or two such events a week. It’s worth celebrating for the hundreds of people who were involved with the set-up of these instruments.

The gravitational waves that LIGO observes are a short pulse of radiation of about 100 cycles per second, which is roughly the orbital period of two 50 solar-mass black holes when they merge together.

But there are far bigger black holes in the centres of galaxies with masses millions of times higher than LIGO can detect. Mergers of these are much rarer, but can be detectable out to greater distances.

The radiation produced, however, is at a much lower frequency. This has to be detected by instruments that, instead of having mirrors a few kilometres apart, has mirrors a few million kilometres apart.

The ESA-led Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) is planned to launch within the next 10 years. It should detect the rare mega-cataclysms when galaxies merge and the supermassive black holes in their centres collide. LMR

20. Psychedelic therapy

After much deliberation and campaigning from various interested parties, 2024 saw the United States Food and Drug Administration opt not to approve official use of MDMA-assisted therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder, citing insufficient evidence of the drug’s (commonly known as ecstasy) efficacy.

Despite this setback, it’s important to appreciate what a substantial breakthrough it is that we’ve even got to this point. While the benefits of psychedelics have a long history, the previous high-watermark of realising their potential therapeutic applications was in the 1950s and 1960s, when LSD use was widespread.

Unfortunately, a combination of LSD’s association with counterculture and President Richard Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’, resulted in LSD – and psychedelics in general – falling victim to the brutal backlash. Their use was suppressed, both recreationally and in research contexts, for decades.

The loosening of the restrictions on research into psychedelics in the 21st century has produced potent and fast-acting treatments for depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorders, addiction and even sexual disorders.

It’s still early days for psychedelic therapies. Much of the research remains small-scale and short term, political and ideological barriers remain, and a mainstream rollout of psychedelic therapy would require significant investment.

Even so, especially with the relative stagnation in ‘traditional’ pharmacological interventions for mental health issues, this growing reassessment of the safety, potency and benefits of psychedelics could prove world-changing.

By Dr Dean Burnett (Neuroscientist and author; Author of Why Your Parents are Hung-Up on Your Phone and What to do About it)

21. Single-cell genomics

The human body is made up of almost 40 trillion cells and conventional wisdom suggests these are divided into about 200 cell types. Before the advent of single-cell genomics, our technologies studied cells in bulk, providing an average readout for thousands of cells without resolution of the individual cell identities.

In the human body, as in all multicellular organisms, there are different cell types within the same tissue that have distinct roles: muscle tissue contains subtypes of muscle cells, but also blood vessels, neurons, immune cells and more.

Without understanding this complexity, it’s impossible to determine how subpopulations of cells in different organs relate to each other and how they might be altered by disease.

In cancer, the DNA of a single cell mutates to allow it to multiply without control, leading to the formation of tumours. The tumour cells then interact with other cells in the microenvironment leading to the spread of the cancer.

Single-cell genomics has the power to resolve the individual cell types and cell states, revealing the pathways that promote tumour growth, allowing for the development of targeted therapy.

Another example is Crohn’s disease, where the comparison of healthy and diseased tissue at the single-cell level revealed the reason for a lack of response to therapy in some patients.

During the pandemic, single-cell genomics was used to determine which cells are susceptible to infection and later studies determined which organs are most affected and why. These are just a few of the applications of single-cell genomics and the list is expanding all the time.

More than 3,000 scientists around the globe are making a Human Cell Atlas (HCA) to provide a complete single-cell map of all the organs of the human body. This initiative has already led to a paradigm shift in the understanding of the function of normal cells and forms the basis for the understanding of the mechanisms leading to diseases.

The progress being made is leading to better diagnosis and treatment.

It has been less than a decade since single-cell analysis was developed and only six years since the HCA was launched. The next decade of single-cell genomics promises to be an even more exciting one.

By Dame Kay Davies (Dr Lee’s Professor of Anatomy Emeritus, University of Oxford)

Read more:

• How to cut your dementia risk: 7 key lessons from the world’s best studies

• How can I tell if I’ve got high cortisol levels?

• Scientists ‘bring back’ the woolly mammoth... as this mouse

22. CT scanning

A little over a century ago, palaeontologists in New York cut open the skull of a Tyrannosaurus rex, so they could see inside its brain cavity. It was a bold thing to do, as they had to destroy some of the priceless fossil. But they decided it was worth it, as it was the only way they could try to understand how this most iconic of dinosaurian beasts sensed its world.

Fast-forward to the turn of the millennium, when new technology rendered these destructive fossil surgeries obsolete.

In 2000, Prof Christopher Brochu published a scintillating study on the brain, intelligence and senses of T. rex. He didn’t use a saw; he used X-rays. Brochu put a fossil T. rex skull into a computed tomography (CT) scanner.

As the skull was the size of a bathtub, he needed to persuade engineers at Boeing to give him access to the machines they used to scan aeroplane engines to look for imperfections. Although huge, the scanner worked like one a doctor would use at a hospital, using a series of X-rays to build a three-dimensional digital model of the stuff inside the skull.

It revealed that T. rex had a big brain with enormous olfactory bulbs, which graced this iconic predator with a sharp sense of smell. Brochu’s study wasn’t the first CT scan of a fossil, but it made worldwide headlines and sparked a torrent of new research.

Suddenly everyone was putting their fossils in CT scanners. Today the procedure is so routine that many palaeontologists have scanners in their labs.

We use them for so many things: to identify hidden bits of fossils still encased in rock, or describe the microtexture and growth marks inside bones to understand how ancient organisms grew and metabolised. They can also help to make digital models that we can subject to computer simulations, testing how dinosaurs fed and moved.

To me, CT scanning is the biggest breakthrough in palaeontology over the last 25 years.

By Prof Steve Brusatte (Professor of Palaeontology and Evolution, University of Edinburgh; Author of The Rise and Fall of the Dinosaurs)

23. NASA’s Curiosity Rover

In the kind of PR masterpiece we’ve come to expect from NASA, they didn’t play down the difficulty of landing their Curiosity rover on Mars. Instead, they called it their “seven minutes of terror” and explained that in those 420 seconds, it had to go from a speed of close to 21,000km/h (13,000mph) to zero in order to land safely on the planet’s surface.

When they achieved that, the mission’s place in history was all but secured, especially since they had used an innovative ‘sky crane’ landing system, which guided the rover to a much more precise landing than any previous planetary mission.

Then came the science.

Since 2012, Curiosity has made ground-breaking discoveries on Mars that help paint a more detailed picture of the planet’s past environment, its previous habitability and even its present ability to support life.

It found chemicals and minerals in Gale Crater that indicated the past presence of liquid water, clearly a pre-requisite for life. It then found various organic molecules that serve as the building blocks for life and can be used as food by microbial organisms.

While they don’t prove that life existed on the planet, they at least show that the correct molecules were present.

But perhaps the rover’s most tantalising discovery has been the detection of a seasonal release of methane from beneath the planet’s surface. Every Martian summer, the gas has welled up from Gale Crater.

While water-rock interactions could be responsible, scientists can’t rule out biological activity. The next generation of Mars rovers, such as ESA’s Rosalind Franklin will carry subsurface drills to investigate further.

Put together, Curiosity’s longevity and its extraordinary scientific results significantly enhance our understanding of Mars, paving the way for future human missions and the search for extraterrestrial life.

To seal its place in 21st-century culture, Curiosity also took a selfie.

By Dr Stuart Clark (Astronomer, science journalist and author; Author of The Search for Earth’s Twin)

24. NASA’s DART mission

This entry made one of the biggest impacts both figuratively and literally. On 26 September 2022, NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission smashed into the asteroid Dimorphos.

The collision destroyed the spacecraft completely and shifted the orbit of the asteroid – all on purpose. DART was a ground-breaking test of our ability to alter the orbit of a small asteroid, should we detect one on a collision course with Earth – and it succeeded spectacularly.

For the first time in history, humankind changed the trajectory of a celestial object and in so doing, proved a method for averting a natural disaster.

The asteroid in question was the smaller component of a double asteroid. The larger of the two is called Didymos. Originally discovered in 1996, Didymos is a chunk of rock with dimensions of roughly 851 x 848 x 620m (2,792 x 2,782 x 2,034ft).

Its companion, eventually named Dimorphos, was confirmed in 2003. With a dimension of just 177 x 174 x 116m (580 x 570 x 38ft), it was the perfect test subject for the mission.

Being locked into orbit around Didymos meant that the amount by which it had been moved would show up in a change of the time it took to circle the larger asteroid.

Before the impact, Dimorphos took just under 12 hours to orbit Didymos. After the impact, this time had decreased by just over half an hour, showcasing a viable method for deflecting potentially hazardous asteroids from Earth.

DART’s accomplishments extend beyond planetary defence, though.

The mission has provided critical data on asteroid composition and impact mechanics, not to mention celestial navigation by hitting a 100m-wide (328ft) target at speeds of kilometres per second while having travelled millions of kilometres from Earth. SC

25. SpaceX’s reusable rockets

For decades, the biggest roadblock to the exploration and utilisation of space has been the cost of launching objects and people into space.

The enormous Saturn V, used to transport astronauts to the Moon in the 1960s and 1970s, achieved a cost of around $5,000 (about £3,950) per kilogram lofted into space, but since the 1990s, smaller disposable rockets have only managed to achieve costs of around $10,000 (approx £7,900) per kilogram.

SpaceX has blown that figure out of the water and is currently in the process of revolutionising spaceflight. The game changer was the introduction of the Falcon 9 reusable rocket in 2015.

With a first stage booster that could return to Earth and land upright, the cost of launching people, supplies and technology into space started to tumble.

The reusability enabled more frequent launches, again expanding the range of commercial and scientific opportunities that space could offer. For example, it has made SpaceX’s Starlink project viable. This endeavour aims to fly thousands of smaller satellites in low-Earth orbit to provide unbreakable global internet coverage.

With Falcon 9, the cost of reaching orbit is around $2,000 (£1,500) per kilogram. The giant Starship rocket that SpaceX is now test-flying is estimated to slash the cost to an extraordinary $200 (£158) per kilogram.

SpaceX’s achievements have reshaped the global aerospace industry and mark a pivotal step toward humankind permanently extending its presence throughout the Solar System. But such progress doesn’t come without a cost.

The ability to launch so much into space threatens to dramatically increase the amount of space debris, which imperils working satellites and interferes with astronomical observations of the night sky.

Hence the innovation that these rockets allow must be understood in relation to the ‘environmental damage’ that it could bring to Earth’s orbits and the night sky in general.

Nevertheless, SpaceX has brought us to a true watershed, not just in science but human history. SC ( BBC Science Focus Magazine)

The man, 39-year-old Esubalew Birhanie, is a ground technician at Toronto’s Pearson airport. He was visiting family in Ethiopia when he was pulled off an airplane last October. Police are accusing him of links to Fano, an ethnic-based militia in Ethiopia’s Amhara region that has been banned by the government.

Esubalew Birhanie has been imprisoned in Ethiopia on allegations that he has links to a militia banned by the government. Mr. Birhanie says he’s being persecuted for comments he made at a meeting in Toronto six years ago.

In an interview in prison, Mr. Birhanie said the police are persecuting him for comments he made at a meeting in Toronto six years ago.

“The Constitution of Canada allows me to speak freely as a citizen,” he told The Globe and Mail. “To be judged in Ethiopia for what I said in Canada is wrong.”

He and his supporters are concerned that the Ethiopian government is seeking to control the behaviour of Ethiopian-Canadians by monitoring and policing their comments in Canada.

A nine-page report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission says it investigated the case and concluded that the Canadian man was “beaten by officers, resulting in significant physical injuries to his waist and ribs.”

The report has not been publicly released but was obtained by The Globe after it was shared with Mr. Birhanie’s family and lawyers this week.

The commission is calling for a full criminal investigation into the Ethiopian police who perpetrated the abuse. It also recommends compensation be paid to Mr. Birhanie for the “physical and psychological trauma” he suffered.

The Toronto man says he was beaten severely and tortured by the police. “They stomped on my neck and my body to break me into confessing what they wanted to hear,” he said.

“I am worried about losing my livelihood. I’m afraid that my case will be prolonged in a broken justice system that disregards human rights.”

Mr. Birhanie appeared in a federal court Tuesday in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, to pursue his challenge to the criminal charges. Wearing a dark yellow uniform and handcuffed to a fellow prisoner, he stumbled as he was pushed into a dimly lit courtroom by heavily armed guards. His two sisters, sitting in the public gallery, wept when they saw him.

In the courtroom, judges read his complaint that he was beaten by police to force him to confess. The case was adjourned to a future date.

Mr. Birhanie travelled to Ethiopia last August to visit family. On Oct. 4, he says, he boarded a Toronto-bound flight at Addis Ababa airport to return home, but a police officer pulled him off the plane and took him to a notorious detention centre, where he was severely beaten. He says the police offered to release him for a bribe of about $23,000.

The police, he says, have repeatedly shown him a video of a meeting sponsored by the Ethiopian government in Toronto in 2020, at which he described the plight of Amhara people who were killed or displaced in Ethiopia’s Oromia region.

He has been charged with inciting terrorism and propagating disinformation and hate speech, with the 2020 video and social-media posts cited as evidence. He denies the charges and says the social-media accounts do not belong to him.

Ethiopian authorities have often used anti-terrorism laws as a pretext to prosecute and imprison dissidents and journalists, according to multiple reports by human-rights groups in recent years.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, shortly after releasing some political prisoners and reaching a peace deal with neighbouring Eritrea. But since then, his government has waged a brutal two-year war in northern Ethiopia, his military has been accused of war crimes and ethnic cleansing, and his police have arrested large numbers of journalists, human-rights defenders and opposition figures.

A spokesperson for Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, Nebiat Getachew, said he was unaware of the case of the imprisoned Canadian. A police spokesperson in Addis Ababa said the case was outside the city’s jurisdiction. Mr. Abiy’s press secretary, Billene Seyoum, did not reply to repeated messages from The Globe seeking comment on the case.

Mr. Birhanie said the Canadian embassy in Addis Ababa sent officials to assist him in detention and sought to halt the beatings by police. He was later transferred to Kilinto prison, on the outskirts of the capital, where political prisoners and journalists are often held.

“Global Affairs Canada is aware of a Canadian citizen detained in Ethiopia,” said Thida Ith, a spokesperson for the department.

“Canadian officials are providing consular assistance and are in contact with local authorities,” she said. “Due to privacy considerations, no further information can be disclosed.”

In a letter to Global Affairs after he was pulled off the plane, Mr. Birhanie’s family said his detention has caused hardship, prolonged uncertainty and emotional distress for his family.

“We are very stressed about his ordeal,” one of his cousins in Canada told The Globe. “He travels every year to visit his family, and we never expected that something like this could happen to him.”

The Globe is not identifying the cousin out of concern for potential retaliation by Ethiopian authorities.

With reporting by a Globe and Mail freelancer in Addis Ababa whose name is being withheld from publication for safety reasons. ( the globe and mail)

After fighting a war against Tigrayan forces from 2020 to 2022, the Ethiopian government may be on the verge of resuming hostilities to consolidate control over the country’s northernmost region.

It is also increasingly threatening Eritrea. Ethiopia fought alongside Eritrea during the Tigray war but is now signalling it may seek to invade to regain direct access to Red Sea ports lost when its northern neighbour gained independence in 1993.

A new conflict could lead to large-scale loss of life in Ethiopia and Eritrea while also triggering a messy, protracted regional crisis, potentially pulling in Sudan, given its military-led government’s fraught relations with the Ethiopian state.

“I can imagine a scenario where Sudanese actors are mobilising to support their preferred partner in Eritrea or Ethiopia,” said Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at Maryland University. “We could begin to see a one-conflict ecosystem.”

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the national army, is fighting a brutal civil war against the paramilitary-turned-rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is accused of genocide crimes, ethnic cleansing, and shocking levels of sexual violence.

Recent reporting has found that Ethiopia is allowing the RSF to use its territory for a covert training camp. Meanwhile, the SAF is formalising ties with Tigray factions and Eritrea to form a front against Addis Ababa if a new war breaks out.

Analysts who spoke to The New Humanitarian said the SAF could directly send supplies to Eritrean and Tigrayan forces in the event of a war, or that militias in eastern Sudan with ties to Eritrea could enter the fray of their own accord.

Ethiopia could then respond by expanding its support to the RSF, with the help of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the chief regional backer of both Addis Ababa and the RSF. Arab states opposed to the UAE’s aggressive foreign policy could be pulled in too.

Alan Boswell, an expert on the Horn of Africa for the International Crisis Group, said the entire region is at risk of erupting due to these overlapping, entangled rivalries and alliances.

“We are in an incredibly dangerous situation, where both sides (Ethiopia and Sudan) view the other as actively helping their armed opponents,” Boswell said. “All the ingredients are there for a much wider regional blow up – really, a regional mega-war.”

Expansionist rhetoric

The last war in northern Ethiopia erupted amid tensions between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – the ruling party in Tigray and the dominant force in Ethiopian national politics until Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office in 2018.

A 2022 ceasefire accord ended the fighting, but tensions between Abiy and TPLF leaders have been growing, and Tigrayan civilians have struggled to recover from the atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and siege campaign carried out by the Ethiopian army and its allies, which may have killed up to 600,000 people.

In January, clashes broke out between the Ethiopian federal army and Tigrayan forces in two Tigrayan districts. The federal government then moved several army divisions towards the Tigray border.

The sharply escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, meanwhile, mark a reversal from a 2018 peace deal that ended two decades of intermittent conflict between the countries, as well the wartime alliance against the TPLF.

Eritrea was critical of the 2022 treaty, but relations with landlocked Ethiopia plummeted over Addis Ababa’s push for sea access, particularly after Abiy signalled Eritrea’s Red Sea port of Assab as a possible option to take over.

“Abiy believes Ethiopia should be a regional hegemon and that he can rectify the historical mistake of giving up sea access to Eritrea,” said Goitom Gebreluel, a regional expert and a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics (LSE).

Against this backdrop, Eritrea shifted its posture from fighting the TPLF – with whom it had a decades-long enmity – to allying with a faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael, which de facto controls much of Tigray.

Sudan is already entangled in this regional power struggle, with the SAF backed by Eritrea and TPLF fighters while facing pressure from Ethiopia’s support of the RSF, which has enabled the group to open a new front in Sudan’s Blue Nile state.

Compounding tensions, the SAF-backed Sudanese government in Port Sudan claimed in early March that drones were fired from Ethiopia against SAF targets, raising the temperature between the two countries.

There are also longer-standing tensions around disputed territory between Sudan and Ethiopia, and around an Ethiopian dam project that Sudan and other downstream countries feel threatens their water security.

If Sudan becomes involved in a new war in and beyond Ethiopia’s north, attention is likely to turn to the thousands of Tigrayan fighters who reportedly fled to eastern Sudan’s Gedaref state during the 2020-2022 conflict.

Among these forces are well-trained Tigrayan fighters who claimed asylum in Sudan after serving as UN peacekeepers in the disputed area of Abyei, between Sudan and South Sudan.

“This area – around Gedaref – could be used as an operation base to plan attacks against [Ethiopia],” said El-Tagani el-Haj Abdelrahman, a Sudanese researcher and the author of a recent report on conflict dynamics in eastern Sudan.

The militias of eastern Sudan

Sudan could also become embroiled in the conflict through communities in the east with strong ties to Eritrea and a longstanding animosity toward Ethiopia’s federal government.

“There are tribal constituencies in eastern Sudan that could get pulled into a broader war [with Ethiopia], turning it into a cross-border [conflict] by nature,” said Woldemariam of Maryland University.

Since winning independence from Ethiopia following three decades of armed struggle, Eritrea has maintained close relations with militias in eastern Sudan, going so far as hosting them when they were fighting the Sudanese government.

Since the outbreak of Sudan’s civil war, Eritrea has again been hosting and training eastern militias with the SAF’s consent, primarily to protect their frontier from an RSF incursion, according to the report by El-Haj Abdelrahman.

The report states that Eritrea is particularly supportive of militias from Sudan’s Beni Amer and Habab communities, which speak Tigre – a language shared by Tigre communities in Eritrea, which make up around 30% of the population.

El-Haj Abdelrahman said many Beni Amer in eastern Sudan feel a close affiliation with the Beni Amer and Tigre in Eritrea and would likely help Eritrea and its allies fight against Ethiopian federal forces.

The early phase of Eritrea’s independence war drew heavily on Beni Amer and Tigre fighters, and though relations between these communities and President Isaias Afwerki have long been strained in both Eritrea and Sudan, the historical enmity with Ethiopia persists, according to El-Haj Abdelrahman.

“For the Beni Amer, Ethiopia are their historical enemies… so they will fight with Isaias against Abiy,” he said.

Could rival Arab powers join the fray?

If Sudan does become involved in a conflict, analysts said Abiy could retaliate by further backing the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a rebel group, in their fight against the SAF.

They said the RSF could also potentially use long-distance drones to target supply lines stretching from Port Sudan into Eritrea or Tigray.

Gebreluel, from the LSE, said the RSF is dependent on Ethiopia and the UAE and “will do anything it can for Ethiopia” if it goes to war. “It just depends on their capacity and whether or not they will be stretched too thin,” he added.

Beyond Sudan, analysts said a worst-case scenario could also see an Ethiopian offensive on Eritrea directly pull in rival Arab powers, especially given current tensions between the UAE – Addis Ababa’s primary backer – and Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

While the UAE is currently focused on intercepting Iranian drones and missiles, its broader perception of security is linked to sea ports in Africa. Two of its national companies manage over a dozen ports on the continent.

The SAF, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, consider Ethiopia’s quest for a Red Sea port as serving the UAE’s geopolitical security interests at the expense of their own, according to media reports and analysts.

The trio view the UAE as undermining regional stability and their national security by backing violent armed groups in Yemen and Sudan, including the RSF.

The UAE has used its access to the port and airport in Bosaso, in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region, to transport weapons to RSF units in Darfur via eastern Libya.

The shipments helped the RSF capture North Darfur’s capital of el-Fasher in October – an offensive culminating with the mass killing and ethnic cleansing of local communities.

To counter the UAE’s influence, rival Arab states could funnel weapons through eastern Sudan to help Eritrean and Tigrayan forces fight Ethiopian federal troops, especially if the port of Assab is attacked.

“Any new conflict [in the Horn] is bad, but one where you see Eritrea pulled in is where you could see the activation of a broader constellation of actors,” warned Woldemariam, the expert from Maryland University.

The human cost

The human cost of a regional war in the Horn of Africa would of course be catastrophic.

Tigray still hasn’t recovered from the previous conflict, which saw government forces and their allies commit massive atrocities against civilians and carry out ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray.

“This isn’t a context where we have seen an end to cycles of forced displacement. It has continued as a result of fighting and abuses,” said Laetitia Bader, the Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch.

With violence simmering, Woldemariam said Tigrayan civilians can’t cope with another all-out conflict. The region is already dealing with a dire shortage of medications and ruptured livelihoods.

“It would be quite dire for the population to enter another war after coming out of one two years ago, in terms of their ability to manage the consequences,” he told The New Humanitarian.

Next door, Sudan remains the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The conflict has uprooted some 15 million people over the last three years, and left 21 million enduring crisis levels of food insecurity or worse, with some facing famine.

Many fear a regional war could worsen the humanitarian crisis by destabilising eastern Sudan, a region where civilians have been relatively better off compared to the rest of the country.

“It’s a very fragile situation in that neck of the woods,” said Woldemariam. “And I think [destabilisation] would be a really large burden for eastern Sudan to bear.”

Edited by Philip Kleinfeld.

Mat Nashed Freelance journalist specialising on geo-politics in the Middle East. He has reported from Egypt, Tunis, Turkey, and Lebanon with a focus on human rights, state repression, and migration

Today, Ethiopians living in the border area have been ordered to leave their villages. Following Abiy Ahmed’s approval of the Rapid Response Force, which is a proxy war promoter for the Emirates, the fighting has spread rapidly to the area, and sources have revealed that the regime’s defense forces have ordered the residents of Kurmuk to leave the city today and are being evacuated.

It is said that the residents of Kurmuk are being evacuated to Horzab and other areas. Kurmuk, like Metema, which is on the border with Gondar, is an Ethiopian city located on the border with Sudan in the Benishangul Asosa region.

AFNM has revealed that they have been using FPV drones to attack ENDF and riot police positions since March 2, 2024 (Yekatit 23, 2016 E.C.) and they have formed a unit in northern Shewa been steadily improving since then.

In the first footage they released, their drones can be seen dropping RPG warheads on troops stationed in Efratana Gidim on February 28, 2025. On March 3, 2025, in Yelen village, Kewet district, they damaged 107mm MLRS rockets and killed their operators.

On May 21, 2025, they attacked the Kewet district riot police (Adma Bitena) camp, killing and injuring 20 personnel.

Tensions have been rising in recent weeks, with reports of troops being moved towards their shared border.

That has been matched by increasingly violent rhetoric online, including a flood of images generated by artificial intelligence that seek to portray their side's military dominance and humiliate rival leaders, while presenting war as swift and cost-free.

They are drawing thousands of interactions within hours of being shared, with comment sections full of threats and more violent imagery.
'National narrative'

Eliyas Kebede Zemedkun, an Ethiopian with more than 80,000 Facebook followers, has spent months creating AI-generated images such as tanks entering Assab port to cheering crowds, or Ethiopia's army chief chasing Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.

He told AFP he wants to promote "Ethiopia's national narrative" and challenge those who try to "downgrade the national army", yet he also admitted that AI "obscures reality" and "normalises aggression".

Eliyas said he uses free platforms like Gemini and ChatGPT to create the content, along with editing software Clideo.

Each post has triggered waves of retaliatory content from pro-Eritrea accounts.

One frequent user, under the name Mimta Grlis, has posted depictions of Abiy being arrested by Eritrean forces or an Ethiopian ship sinking in the Red Sea.

Kjetil Tronvoll, an expert on the region at Oslo New University College, said similar online clashes helped drive aggression during the civil war in Ethiopia's Tigray region in 2020-2022, which killed an estimated 600,000 people, but this has been turbo-charged by AI.

"When people believe fabricated visuals are real, it fuels genuine anger, fear, and animosity," he said.

Digital literacy is still limited in Ethiopia, which ranked 112 out of 149 countries on the latest World Economic Forum's Digital Skills Index.

"The videos are not close to reality in most cases, but even when they're not realistic, the emotional reaction is very strong due to their provocative nature and limited media literacy (of the viewers)," said AI expert Amanuel Meseret.

These videos dramatise war as a quick and effortless victory... constructing a false reality that risks steering opinion and political discourse toward confrontation rather than resolution

A review of the comments posted beneath the AI-generated images suggests many social media users believe they are genuine.

Decades of conflict and trauma also mean that even obviously fake images can trigger audiences or play into their existing worldview.
Divided opinion

Alemshet Moges, an ex-military officer turned journalist, said a clip of a drone attack on the Eritrean city of Asmara reflected how he imagined a conflict could play out.

"I don't want war to start, but if it does, I believe Ethiopian drones will be the game-changer," he said.

Others are simply horrified.

"They are very harmful in our context," said Hawi Abebe, an accountant in Addis Ababa, when shown some of the content.

Workineh Diribsa, a journalism lecturer at Ethiopia's Jimma University, said tech companies should be pressed to remove harmful images and that media literacy programmes were vital to help citizens "identify, question, and resist manipulative content".

"These videos dramatise war as a quick and effortless victory... constructing a false reality that risks steering opinion and political discourse toward confrontation rather than resolution," he said.

AFP

The ethnic-religious violence against Ethiopian Christians is ongoing amid a wider jihadist campaign that is targeting many nations in Africa.

Dozens of Ethiopians have been murdered in several religious- and ethnic-inspired attacks over the past several months. During late February and early March, for instance, militants carried out coordinated attacks in which over 30 people were killed in the Arsi Zone of Oromia, the largest and most populous region in Ethiopia, according to church officials who spoke to the BBC.

Christians in the country are mainly targeted by two groups: Islamic forces and far-left groups, with the complicity of the government and local authorities.

The first part of this series analyzes the Islamic groups targeting Ethiopian Christians. The second part concerns the Marxist and other far-left groups, as well as the ethnic-based violence they are facing.

Ethiopia ranks 36 out of 50 in the World Watch List of Open Doors, which monitors the persecution of Christians around the world. “Persecution in Ethiopia is complex and multifaceted, shaped by a blend of historical legacies, religious dominance, regional dynamics, and ongoing political instability,” according to a 2026 country report by Open Doors.

The Arrival of Islam

How did Islam arrive in Ethiopia, a historically Christian country, and grow there to the point that it is now a major source of persecution for Christians?

Ethiopia is a country located on the Horn of Africa and has a population of approximately 138 million people. It is home to a diverse array of cultures and ethnicities: it has over ninety distinct ethnic groups with unique languages and traditions.

Ethiopia established Christianity as its official state religion in the early fourth century (circa 330–340 AD) under King Ezana of Aksum. Based on church tradition, Ethiopia’s conversion to Christianity is traced to the Ethiopian eunuch, a high-ranking official baptized by the Apostle Philip (according to the New Testament’s Book of Acts).

This move established the Aksumite Empire (modern Ethiopia and Eritrea) as a major early Christian power, and the faith has been integral to the region’s culture ever since. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, whose origins trace back to the fourth century, is one of the world’s oldest.

The Bible mentions Ethiopia multiple times, and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church maintains a rich, ancient tradition. Christianity has served as a unifying force which has for centuries shaped the literature, art, and identity of Ethiopia.

Islam, however, arrived in Ethiopia during the early seventh century, primarily through the First Hijra (613–615), when Muhammad (Islam’s founder) instructed his followers to leave Mecca and seek refuge in the Christian Kingdom of Aksum. Early Muslims settled in areas like Negash (Tigray), which became an important center for early Islamic history in Ethiopia.

Between 1527 and 1543, Ethiopia faced repeated attacks followed by a military occupation from a Muslim sultanate. During this period, Ethiopia was occupied by a jihadist army raised from the Sultanate of Adal, which grew from the remnants of the Sultanate of Ifat in the late fourteenth century. Ifat was a medieval Sunni Muslim state in the eastern regions of the Horn of Africa between the late thirteenth century and early fifteenth century. It was formed in present-day Ethiopia in the region of Ifat. The Islamic kingdom ruled over parts of what are now Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland, and Somalia.

The sixteenth-century jihad led by Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmad Gragn) of the Adal Sultanate aimed to conquer Ethiopia, resulting in widespread destruction of churches, forced conversions to Islam, and the temporary collapse of the Christian Ethiopian empire.

Habtamu Mengistie Tegegne, a professor of history, notes:

“The jihad of Ahmad ultimately had as its object the conversion of Ethiopia to Islam. Śihāb ad-Dín, Ahmad’s Yemeni follower and chronicler, constantly referred to Ethiopians as ‘infidels,’ ‘polytheists,’ and ‘idol-worshipers’ who deserved to be fought, converted, and enslaved. With the exception of those located in inaccessible areas, all churches and monasteries were looted and razed to the ground and an estimated nine out of every ten Christians converted to Islam.”

During the Ethiopian–Adal War, Ahmad Al-Ghazi’s forces were Ottoman-backed and involved a coalition of several Islamic forces and ethnicities (at least six) that included Arabs, Somalis, Hararis, Harla, and a number of other tribes.

In addition to genociding Christians and burning churches, they looted copious amounts of gold from the Ethiopian kingdom and are recorded (in Futuh al-Habasha) to have melted down a church entirely plated in gold leaf known as “Mekane Selassie” (Abode of the Trinity) in Amhara, a wonder which Ahmad’s forces said they had never seen the like of it anywhere, and which had taken the Emperor Na’od thirteen years to build.

The campaign was a major effort to establish dominance over the Christian Kingdom. This jihad, supported by Ahmad’s Muslim allies, resulted in heavy material, human, and territorial losses for Christians. According to historian Tegegne,

“The Muslim seizure of Ethiopian provinces led to a tremendous expansion in the slave trade within the region, and included the enslavement and forced conversion of Christians… In fact, in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, jihad was a primary method of obtaining Ethiopian slaves.”

Christianity’s Tenuous Comeback

The jihad ended in 1543 following the death of Imam Ahmad in battle against a combined Ethiopian and Portuguese force, restoring the Christian Solomonic dynasty.

In 1548, King Gälawdéwos of Ethiopia issued a royal edict, now held at Tädbabä Maryam (an ancient monastery), which banned the sale of Christians to Muslims and other non-Christians. This decree sought to combat the intensified sixteenth-century slave trade, particularly after conflicts with the Adal Sultanate.

Today, Ethiopia is a majority-Christian country (61%), with a large Muslim minority. Approximately 43% of the population identifies as Orthodox Christian, 33% as Muslim, and 20% as Protestant. In the eastern and southeastern regions Islam is predominant.

Open Doors reports that Islam is increasing its influence in Ethiopia at local, regional, and national levels, placing Christian communities, especially converts, in a vulnerable position:

“In Muslim-majority rural areas, Christians often face harassment, exclusion from communal resources, and violent attacks, some of them fatal. Converts from Islam are particularly at risk, frequently disowned by family, denied inheritance and child custody rights, and targeted for public shaming or assault.”

The spread of Islamic radicalism from neighboring countries like Somalia and Sudan has further deepened the threat, as cross-border radical networks affect Ethiopia’s border regions, adds Open Doors.

In an interview with this author, Tedla Melaku, an Ethiopian-American humanitarian advocate and author of the book Reason and the Sacred: Ethiopian Metaphysics said:

“Ethiopia’s Christian kingdom, through its leadership, the Solomonic dynasty, successfully fought against Islamist powers and their expansion since at least the medieval period, protecting the Church: The Sultanate of Ifat in the 13th–15th centuries, and the Adal Sultanate, which it eventually defeated; it fought and overcame several regional emirates, prevented Ottoman expansion into the interior of Ethiopia, and defeated the Mahdists and the Khedivate of Egypt at war, too. Ethiopia’s ancient Christian tradition was preserved through resistance, martyrdom, and alliances with other Christian nations—namely, the Portuguese in the 16th century, who intervened to defend Ethiopia against the Ottoman-backed Adal Sultanate.

“Many Islamist attacks and invasions took place, resulting in forced conversions and the destruction of magnificent Christian monuments and relics as chronicled in the Futuh al- Habasha, a 16th-century Arabic chronicle detailing the Ethiopian–Adal war; but due to a strong Christian leadership that understood what was at stake, Ethiopian Christians were able to protect the Church and their Christian heritage through great sacrifices. The West could learn that what is at stake, when allowing Islamist expansion, is far greater than anything imaginable, and that Europe’s Christian civilization and identity must be protected at all cost, as it was in the past through its Christian kings and leaders. Christianity is to be protected by God-fearing, strong leaders.”

Part 2: Far-Left Threats and the Government’s Involvement

Ethiopia is once again experiencing heightened violence after a brutal civil war devastated communities from 2020 to 2022. In recent years, the country has experienced severe human rights violations, further exacerbated by conflicts in the Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara regions.

A peace agreement between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formally ended the fighting in 2022. However, it did not end the human rights violations.

Over the past seven years, Ethiopian Christians have been subjected to extensive human rights abuses. These violations are marked by recurring incidents of massacres, extrajudicial killings, drone strikes, forced displacements, sexual violence, and mass arrests, amongst other atrocities.

Such acts of violence are orchestrated by far-left armed groups. These incidents often involve the complicity or passive acquiescence of local authorities. They are predominantly driven by ethnic and religious discrimination, leading to substantial casualties.

Ethiopia is an ethnically diverse nation with around ninety distinct ethnic groups. Oromo, the country’s largest ethno-linguistic group, constitutes more than one-third of the population and is home to the largest Muslim community. A significant portion of the Oromo population also identifies as Christian. The Amhara, who are Orthodox Christian, are the next largest ethno-linguistic group in the country. Other major groups include the Somali, Tigray, Sidama, Gurage, Welaita, and Afar.

Ethiopia primarily adheres to Christianity (~60%) and Islam (~33%). The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (~43%) is dominant, particularly in the north, while Protestantism (20%) is growing in the south and west. Islam is prevalent in the Afar, Somali, and Oromia regions.

Escalating Violence

The Amhara people in Ethiopia have faced persecution and massacres for several decades. Various groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)/Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which are rooted in Marxism-Leninism and ethno-nationalism, as well as the ruling Prosperity Party (PP), are accused of orchestrating these crimes.

Meanwhile, violence has escalated in the Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray regions and surrounding areas of Ethiopia since the beginning of this year. Rising tensions between the Ethiopian government and Eritrea regarding their disputed border territory have also brought the November 2022 Peace Agreement to the verge of collapse.

The Amhara Association of America (AAA), in a February 8 press statement, said the war was being carried out by the ruling Prosperity Party in cooperation with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and allied forces, including Oromia Region Special Forces. “Abuses were predominantly identity-based, targeting ethnic Amhara communities and persons affiliated to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC),” the statement said.

In January 2026 alone, AAA’s initiative Amhara War Updates (AWU) recorded battle events and human rights incidents across 106 distinct districts in 19 zonal administrations in four regions (Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Addis Ababa). “While the majority of human rights incidents implicated Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP) regime forces, other perpetrators included Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) forces, Oromia Region Forces, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) militants and Gumuz militants,” AWU said.

Since January 2023, there have been consistent reports of the Ethiopian government orchestrating discriminatory displacements, targeting primarily non-Oromos, especially Amharas, in the vicinity of the capital.

The European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) reported:

“The prevailing anti-Amhara sentiment is closely tied to an aversion to the Orthodox faith, as most of the Amhara people are Orthodox Christians…

“The human rights violations range from forced displacement and mass arrests to systematic massacres and ethnic cleansings. For instance, on June 18, 2022, the Amhara community in Wollega within the Oromia region of Ethiopia was brutally slaughtered in what is now called the Gimbi massacre. The victim count is between 400–500 people. The modus operandi involved extreme cruelty, including the burning alive of individuals and the mutilation of pregnant women…

“These violations not only qualify as crimes against humanity but also evince a systematic trajectory toward genocide.”

In May 2022, the government reportedly detained over 4,000 ethnic Amhara individuals. This number surged following the declaration of a state of emergency in August 2023. The ECLJ noted: “While these issues have garnered international attention, the extent of the abuses, specifically those inflicted upon the Amhara population, lacks sufficient coverage.”

Tedla Melaku, an Ethiopian-American author and humanitarian advocate whose academic background is in philosophy and social sciences, is trying to raise awareness about the persecution of Christians in Ethiopia. His book Reason and the Sacred: Ethiopian Metaphysics explores Orthodox Christian theology and Christian mysticism, with a focus on Ethiopia’s unique ancient Jewish-Middle Eastern links and a Semitic tradition that blends Temple Judaism and Christian Orthodoxy—a history that stretches back to early antiquity.

In an interview with this author, Melaku said:

“The greatest challenges Ethiopian Christians face are Islamic terrorism, Marxism, ethnic fascism, and factions that seek to destroy Ethiopia’s Judeo-Christian (literally) foundations and its Orthodox Christian traditions. Wahhabi-related forces in Ethiopia, collaborating with ethno-fascist elements in power within the regime, have been massacring Christians and burning churches, while also targeting specific groups, such as the Amhara people, due to their Semitic and largely Christian heritage.

“On the other hand, Marxist forces have for decades attacked the Church and Ethiopia’s Christian heritage. This started with the murder of the last Christian Emperor in 1974 and the execution of the patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. They killed hundreds of thousands in a course of seventeen years during the communist Derg regime, and later, another Marxist-ethno-fascist group, the TPLF, took over to introduce ‘ethnic federalism,’ intending to disintegrate the country and weaken the Orthodox Church. Those who are now in power are also infiltrating the Church to weaken it, causing a great amount of harm.

“Far-left groups, such as the TPLF and OLF/OLA, including the current regime itself, have been waging war against the Amhara people with the intent of destroying Ethiopia’s historical identity, its noble and patriotic heritage, and its Judeo-Christian civilization. The TPLF described themselves as ‘anti-Amhara imperialists’ in the early manifesto and sought to ‘bury’ Ethiopia’s Christian monarchical structure and break the country apart to create a new ethnostate; while OLF/OLA sought to destroy the Semitic heritage as whole, destroy Ethiopia itself which they perceive as an ‘Orthodox Christian expansionist force with Semitic roots.’ Both terror groups caused the death and destruction of innumerable people and Christian heritage over decades. The current regime has also been at war with the Amhara people who are fighting for their survival as a community and to protect their heritage.

“The current US administration and other pro-Western organizations should understand that the Amhara are fighting for their survival and to preserve Ethiopia’s longstanding heritage—one of the oldest Christian cultures, whose alliance with Christian Europeans can be traced back to antiquity when Ethiopia’s Axumite Empire and the Byzantine Empire collaborated. It is also a prestigious, biblical culture, albeit facing serious challenges, originating in the ancient dominion of the Queen of Sheba, and her visit to ancient Israel to meet King Solomon. These far-left forces are committing cultural erasure, as well as ethnic cleansing and genocide in order to destroy and bury this heritage and change the demographics of the region. The forces that are actively destroying Ethiopia’s Judeo-Christian heritage and committing massacres, mainly targeting the Amhara community, should be recognized as terror groups.”

Uzay Bulut is a fellow at the Ideological Defense Institute.

https://idicenter.org/

Why does it matter? A war would be devastating for all three players in a region where past conflicts have cost hundreds of thousands of lives. It would also overlap with the fighting in neighbouring Sudan, dragging in powerful states from outside the Horn of Africa and further roiling the volatile Red Sea region.

What should be done? Influential African states, alongside outside powers with interests in the Horn of Africa, should engage in quiet diplomacy to deter the onset of conflict. Concerned states should initiate efforts to address each side’s grievances, including Ethiopia’s desire for reliable sea access and Eritrea’s fears of an attack on its sovereignty.

I. Overview

The risk of a new war involving Ethiopia, its neighbour Eritrea and its northernmost Tigray region remains palpable just three years after the last round of deadly conflict. That war ended with the Tigrayans’ defeat by a coalition including Ethiopia, Eritrea and local forces, an alliance that disintegrated soon after a peace deal was inked in November 2022. Relations dipped further when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced his intention to secure sovereign sea access for his landlocked country, which Eritrea fears he will try to achieve by invading. With Ethiopia and Eritrea at loggerheads, Addis Ababa accuses the leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), its foe in the last war, of forging a clandestine alliance with Eritrea. Tensions are running high as all sides prepare for a fight, though the huge costs of another conflict are helping hold them back. To stave off a descent into war, states in Africa as well as international partners should urgently establish back channels among Addis Ababa, Asmara and the TPLF to address their differences.

Today’s jockeying among Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray stems from the messy aftermath of the 2020-2022 war in Ethiopia’s north east. Hostilities broke out in November 2020 after tensions between Prime Minister Abiy, who had taken power in April 2018, and the TPLF came to a boil. The war pitted Tigrayan forces against a coalition including Ethiopian and Eritrean troops, as well as paramilitary forces from Ethiopia’s Amhara and Afar regions. As in previous Ethiopian conflicts, the human toll of the battle was shockingly high, with tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.

A peace agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa in November 2022 stilled the fighting, but opened new fault lines in its wake. It left the TPLF weakened but still standing, laying out a vague roadmap for reintegrating Tigray into the Ethiopian federation. Meanwhile, Abiy’s wartime coalition crumbled. Both Eritrea and the Amhara felt let down by the peace deal. A network of Amhara militias rebelled against the federal government after an effort by Abiy to dismantle them. The brief rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea also soured. Abiy’s publicly stated quest to regain sea access for Ethiopia angered Eritrea, which regarded it as a threat to the Red Sea coastline that Ethiopia lost following Eritrea’s 1993 independence. Ethiopia, for its part, accused its neighbour of redoubling its support for armed opposition groups and occupying Ethiopian territory in Tigray.

The peace agreement also plunged the TPLF into bitter factionalism. A core of the front’s senior leaders (often referred to as the “old guard”) turned against the deal, which had been signed when the TPLF’s military was staring at defeat. They subsequently accused the new Tigray administration under Getachew Reda, who represented the TPLF at the Pretoria talks, of allying with Abiy. In partnership with Tigrayan generals, they overthrew Getachew’s administration in March 2025, forcing its leaders to flee to Addis Ababa. Ethiopian authorities and their Tigrayan allies in turn accused the TPLF’s old guard, who had wrested back control of the movement, of forging common cause with Eritrea.

A low-level intra-Tigrayan conflict, with the TPLF arrayed against an Addis Ababa-backed group, is now escalating. Meanwhile, fighting flared in Tselemti, a district claimed by both Tigray and its neighbouring region of Amhara: in January, the TPLF sent forces into the area, where they clashed with federal troops and Amhara militias, raising the prospect that the TPLF might try to recapture better defended Western Tigray, which remains under Amhara control. The federal government responded with drone strikes and a military build-up on Tigray’s boundaries. These and other disputes, including federal efforts to prevent the TPLF from participating in forthcoming elections as well as pauses in Tigray’s federal budget subsidies, are stoking animosity between Addis Ababa and the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, as well as embittering relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Civil war in neighbouring Sudan has fuelled these tensions. Abiy is close to the United Arab Emirates, which in turn supports the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s grinding conflict. Eritrea, for its part, has sided with the Sudanese army and the associated government. It has forged a relationship with another of the army’s backers, Egypt – which happens to be a big rival of Addis Ababa’s at present due to frictions over Nile River waters. The TPLF has also tilted toward the army’s side in Sudan. With a rift also opening between the UAE and Saudi Arabia (which also favours the army), Horn of Africa politics are suffused with mistrust and apprehension about expanding conflict, while foreign mediation faces seemingly insurmountable challenges.

Until now, all sides nonetheless appear to have understood the appalling risks of outright war, which could cost many thousands of lives and set off an unpredictable chain reaction throughout the region. While Ethiopia remains the stronger power, with a much larger population and economy, its military chiefs seem wary of initiating a new full-scale war with Eritrea even as they go about boosting the preparedness of the armed forces. Even a limited campaign aimed at seizing an Eritrean seaport – most likely Assab – could place Ethiopia in a wider conflict with a determined adversary. Abiy may also fear the economic consequences of international censure, especially the suspension of support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Asmara, for its part, is in defensive mode. It is unlikely to start a major new conflict, at least not intentionally, given the existential threat that war with Ethiopia could pose. This time round, all the belligerent noises about the injustice of Ethiopia lacking its own seaport and the veiled threats to remedy it have come from Addis Ababa.

As for Tigray, federal authorities may still be reluctant to resort to all-out force to remove the TPLF from power, despite the clashes in Tselemti and its frustrations with the region’s leaders. Instead, it could opt to weaken, divide and contain the Tigrayan authorities. Tigray’s rulers may also prefer to avoid another bout of direct confrontation with Addis Ababa, given the damage to Tigrayan forces done by the last war and the resistance of much of the region’s exhausted population to fresh mobilisation.

Even so, the stakes are high and the flashpoints are numerous, making it imperative that Addis Ababa, Asmara and the TPLF establish more effective communication. Contacts should aim at the very least at stopping any skirmish or misunderstanding from escalating. To achieve this end, the main African states involved in the 2022 peace agreement – Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria – should work through the African Union to broker talks between the federal government and the TPLF. A first step would be to ease the tensions between the TPLF and its Addis Ababa-backed rival, the Tigray Peace Forces, and halt the build-up of proxy forces on both sides.

Healing the Ethiopia-Eritrea rift will be harder, but more can be done to that effect. Major powers, including the U.S., the European Union, China, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and others, should reiterate that Ethiopian military action against Eritrea is unacceptable, while looking for ways to mediate discreetly between the sides. All those with access to Asmara from the Horn of Africa and beyond, including Kenya, Saudi Arabia and China, should urge it to end its meddling in Ethiopia so as not to provoke a direct conflict that Eritrea does not want. Foreign powers could also engage in a candid discussion with Ethiopia and its neighbours about Addis Ababa’s aspirations for more reliable sea access. Short of a devastating war, it is hard to see how Ethiopia will achieve the most ambitious versions of its demand for coastal territory. Still, the country’s neighbours, especially Eritrea, Djibouti, breakaway Somaliland, Somalia and Kenya, should be ready to talk with Ethiopia about how its legitimate concerns as a landlocked state might be addressed, including through diversifying its commercial port usage.

While all sides appear to be preparing for a return to fighting – and ominous reports of troop movements in northern Ethiopia emerged in early February – the fact that at present no one seems to be seeking to start a new war offers hope that it can be averted.

II. From Ruinous War to Fragile Peace

Ethiopia is gripped by rising tensions between the federal government in Addis Ababa, on one side, and the Tigray region and its northern neighbour, Eritrea, on the other. The standoff is partly a relic of the 2020-2022 war, which pitted the TPLF – the dominant political party in Tigray – against an alliance among the Ethiopian federal government, various armed groups and Eritrea. That war followed a rapid deterioration in relations between Addis Ababa and Mekelle after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) national government, which the TPLF had dominated, collapsed in 2018. 1

The prime minister who then took charge of Ethiopia and continues to rule the country to this day, Abiy Ahmed, hails from the country’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo. After his accession, Abiy purged leading officials, many of them Tigrayan, who had served under the EPRDF regime. Numerous other senior Tigrayan officials, for their part, were unwilling to work with Abiy or join his newly created Prosperity Party. 2 Dozens of Tigrayans previously in positions of influence subsequently decamped to their home region to protect their interests and prepare for a possible confrontation with Abiy’s government.

Matters soon took a turn for the worse. In September 2020, the TPLF held regional elections in Tigray in defiance of Addis Ababa, which had postponed nationwide polls due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relations between Tigray and Addis Ababa worsened quickly. Tigrayan troops staged a mutiny that November, capturing the army’s Northern Command based in Mekelle. The federal government responded with a full-scale offensive. Two years of brutal conflict ensued. Ethiopia’s national army, paramilitary forces from the Amhara and Afar regions, and the Eritrean military, which backed the federal government after a rapprochement between the long-time antagonists in 2018, made up one side. 3 On the other were the newly established Tigrayan Defence Forces (TDF), formed out of Tigrayan members of the armed forces, the paramilitary Tigray Special Forces and locally recruited militias. The war ebbed and flowed, but in the second half of 2022 Abiy’s coalition made a decisive advance into Tigray, forcing the outgunned TPLF to sue for peace in November 2022.

The deal that ended the war came with a promise to restore federal authority and essential services to Tigray, in return for which the TPLF’s forces would demobilise. 4 It was also agreed that the region would be governed by an interim administration, funded from the federal budget. Led by the TPLF’s former spokesperson, Getachew Reda, who had signed the peace accord on the group’s behalf, the administration would have a two-year mandate. Getachew had narrowly won an internal election to lead it, though many senior TPLF figures were unhappy with this outcome. Their original choice was Debretsion Gebremichael, Tigray’s pre-war president, but Abiy, who retained veto power in selecting the administration’s leader, had ruled him out. 5 Abiy’s refusal sowed seeds of division within the TPLF that would grow over the next two years.

As well as fracturing Tigray’s main political force, the messy end to the war scrambled relations among the main belligerents. A first casualty was the short-lived alliance between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The federal government’s decision to make peace with the TPLF angered Isaias Afwerki, the Eritrean president, who harboured a deep enmity for the movement due to its role as the dominant party in the EPRDF coalition that had fought a border war with Eritrea from 1998-2000. Isaias stated in early 2023 that the peace agreement was designed to “[halt] the military progress and advances of the counter-offensive [against the TPLF]”, when his preference was to inflict a thorough defeat. 6 Abiy, in contrast, was prepared to allow a weakened TPLF to retain political control of Tigray so long as the new regional leadership stayed under his influence. 7

Relations between the Amhara region and the federal government also nosedived. In April 2023, Abiy decided to disband Ethiopia’s regional special forces in an attempt to centralise control of the country’s security apparatus. This decision went down badly in Amhara, whose special forces, alongside locally recruited militias known as Fano, had played an important role in fighting the TPLF and occupied swathes of Tigray to which the Amhara staked historical claims. With its ranks swollen by former special forces members, the Fano launched an insurgency against the federal government in August 2023. 8 Soon thereafter, Addis Ababa accused Asmara, which had invested heavily in building up the Amhara militias to fight the TPLF, of channelling support to the Fano. 9 The insurgency has since dragged on for more than two years, causing thousands of deaths and spurring a mass deployment of Ethiopian soldiers to the region. 10

Later in 2023, Abiy raised the stakes further by stating that Ethiopia must be free of its “geographic prison” – its landlocked status – which he and many Ethiopians regard as a constraint on its security and prosperity. 11 Ethiopia lost its Red Sea coast when Eritrea seceded – initially amicably – in 1993. During Eritrea’s first five years of independence, Ethiopia continued to rely on the port of Assab in southern Eritrea for most of its foreign trade. This arrangement ended, however, when the two countries fought a war between 1998 and 2000 sparked by a dispute over the Badme border region. After the war ended, ties remained frozen and Ethiopia’s sea access via Assab was lost, leaving it reliant on neighbouring Djibouti’s port. 12 Nor was Ethiopia able to use Assab during the short-lived warming of relations with Eritrea from 2018 to 2022. 13 Abiy has denied accusations that he is considering taking control of a port on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast by force, but many in Asmara fear that such action is precisely what he has in mind. 14

In January 2024, Abiy briefly assuaged these concerns in Eritrea when he unexpectedly came to an agreement with neighbouring Somaliland. Somaliland broke away from Somalia in 1991, but its declared independence remains unrecognised by any country except Israel. The deal reportedly gave Ethiopia access to a strip of land on Somaliland’s coastline to construct a naval base in return for promising to grant such recognition. The Somali authorities in Mogadishu reacted furiously to this announcement, while Asmara and Cairo took advantage of the spat to press their own grievances with Addis Ababa. 15 For several months, relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu were so parlous that it seemed possible Ethiopian troops in the African Union peacekeeping mission aimed at countering Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency in Somalia, would be expelled. 16 But in late 2024, Türkiye intervened to broker a deal between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu (the Ankara Declaration), which in effect spelled the end of Abiy’s aspirations for a naval base in Somaliland. 17 As a result, the focus of Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions appeared to shift back to Assab.

III. High Stakes in Tigray after the Conflict

With relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the decline, political disputes in Tigray also started to heat up as various factions of the TPLF wrestled with one another. The TPLF old guard blamed Getachew Reda for signing a peace deal they had come to refer to as the “surrender document”. Feeling sidelined under the new regional authorities, they coalesced around TPLF chair Debretsion Gebremichael and started a campaign to oust Getachew and his allies. 18 They accused the interim administration of failing to kick-start Tigray’s post-war recovery and to ensure that key parts of the peace agreement were honoured. Chief among these was what they claim was Addis Ababa’s promise to return the disputed Western Tigray area (known as Welkait in Amhara), which has remained under Amhara’s control after its militias overran it during the war, to Tigray. 19 Tens of thousands of Tigrayans displaced from the area have been unable or unwilling to go home.

Control of Tigray’s economy also fuelled rancour. The boom in gold mining, in which senior TDF officers are deeply involved, has stirred competition for the profits. 20 TPLF factions have also struggled bitterly for authority over the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray – a conglomerate of TPLF-controlled companies – and its subsidiaries. 21

In August 2024, Debretsion’s faction made its move against Getachew, attempting to expel him from the party and replace him as regional president via a vote by delegates to a TPLF party congress. Getachew and allies boycotted the congress, refusing to relinquish their positions in the interim administration. The federal government sided with Getachew, stating that only Abiy could remove him from power.

At the same time as the TPLF factions were facing off, Tigray was becoming the centre of a tug of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Toward the end of the 2020-2022 war, Abiy had tried to convince the TPLF leaders then in charge of Tigray, which sits on Eritrea’s southern border, to ally with Addis Ababa as a bulwark against Asmara. 22 Instead, after the peace agreement, the Debretsion faction of the TPLF began to explore the polar opposite: a détente with Eritrea, built around their shared antipathy for Abiy’s government and the new administration in Mekelle, which they saw as aligned with Addis Ababa. 23

Parts of the TPLF appeared to believe that a better relationship with Eritrea would protect Tigray from a future conflict in which it might again be confronted by both Addis Ababa and Asmara, the alliance that brought the region to its knees in 2022. 24 Eritrean authorities, for their part, may see strategic advantage in improving relations with Tigray to deter future Ethiopian aggression. By depriving Addis Ababa of Tigrayan support, or so the thinking goes, Eritrea could establish a buffer zone on its southern border.

Another element in the warming relations between Tigray and Eritrea is their shared backing for the Sudanese army in its fight with the RSF, a war in which rival powers in the Horn of Africa have aligned with different sides. Eritrea has come to see the Sudanese army, which controls Khartoum and most of Sudan’s centre and east, as the best available ally to manage security along its western border. President Isaias is also chary of the widening footprint of the UAE, the RSF’s chief sponsor, in the Horn. 25 Several thousand Tigrayans, mostly from Western Tigray/Welkait, have fought alongside the Sudanese army after being stranded in eastern Sudan during the Tigray war. 26 Egypt, Ethiopia’s other most important regional rival, is also a close wartime ally of the Sudanese army.

For much of the war, Ethiopia was careful to maintain an official stance of neutrality, though it cultivated friendly ties to the RSF whereas its relations with Sudan’s army were often strained. From late 2025, however, the Sudanese army started to accuse Ethiopia of providing military and logistical support to the RSF through its western Benishangul-Gumuz region, which borders Sudan, as well as by air. 27 Addis Ababa’s perception that it is facing the emergence of a hostile regional alliance, including Egypt, Eritrea, the Sudanese army and the TDF, appears to be pulling Ethiopia further into the Sudan war, including through the alleged construction of an RSF training camp in Benishangul-Gumuz. 28 A deeper relationship between Addis Ababa and the RSF would exacerbate the antagonism with Asmara and Mekelle. An additional factor that could inflame regional tensions is the quarrel between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that began in late December 2025. 29

The resulting thaw between Eritrea and the most powerful TPLF faction, headed by Debretsion, has infuriated Addis Ababa. Many observers worried that a move by this group to dislodge Getachew, the leader of a regional administration backed by the Ethiopian federal government, and then seize power in Tigray with Eritrean support, would trigger a forthright military response from Addis Ababa.

A decision by TDF officers in January 2025 to shift from neutrality in the TPLF’s internal dispute toward support for Debretsion’s faction aggravated these concerns. 30 These Tigrayan forces immediately set about removing local authorities and mayors appointed by the interim administration. 31 Getachew announced the suspension of three senior TDF officers whom his administration had identified as commanding the operations. 32 All three refused to stop performing their duties. With his power ebbing away, Getachew and his close ally General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a senior TDF commander during the war, fled Tigray for Addis Ababa in March 2025, accusing their opponents within the TPLF and TDF of carrying out a coup. 33

Despite fears that Getachew’s ouster would spark military intervention by Addis Ababa, cooler heads prevailed. In late March, with the regional administration’s two-year term running out, Abiy replaced Getachew with Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede, the TDF commander and Getachew’s deputy, whose mandate would run until elections planned to be held nationwide in 2026. Having remained publicly neutral in the standoff between Getachew and Debretsion’s TPLF faction, Tadesse was seen as a compromise figure. Both the new powers in Tigray and the federal government believed they could work with him. 34 Still, though Ethiopia had avoided a new round of conflict, the confrontation involving Abiy, the TPLF and Asmara continued to worsen.

IV. Power Struggles Intensify

Following the reconfiguration of Tigray’s regional administration, its relations with the federal government have become ever more fractious. At the same time, Addis Ababa and Asmara have traded increasingly venomous accusations and engaged in a military build-up, either directly or through proxy forces. With the danger of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the rise, Tigray risks becoming a pawn in a wider interstate struggle that could drag in Sudan, Egypt and Gulf Arab states.

Since Tadesse Werede came to power in April 2025, relations between Tigray and Ethiopian authorities have deteriorated further, while the influence of the TPLF (now in effect controlled by the old guard led by Debretsion, who have ousted Getachew and allies from the party) over the interim administration has risen. 35 The regional authorities blame economic restrictions imposed by the federal government for the miserable state of Tigray’s economy, including reported constraints on fuel supplies and, even more seriously, the freezing of federal budget subsidies for a time in late 2025. 36 In early December, Tadesse claimed that his administration was unable to pay civil servants and that banks were running out of cash. 37

Addis Ababa also says Mekelle has made little progress in fulfilling commitments Tadesse made to Abiy when he took office. 38 In particular, the federal government accuses TPLF leaders of deepening their relations with Eritrea. According to the federal authorities, the TPLF and Asmara have continued a relationship of “cooperation and coordination”, as Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos asserted in a strongly worded letter sent to diplomatic missions in 2025. 39

Addis Ababa has responded by seeking to undermine the TPLF’s hold on Tigray, capitalising on its already fraying popularity among an exhausted population. In May 2025, the National Election Board of Ethiopia deregistered the TPLF as a political party after a dispute over the organisation of a party congress. 40 The same month, the election board swiftly registered the newly formed Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party (known as Semret, “solidarity” in Tigrinya), headed by Getachew from his exile in Addis Ababa. 41 Rivalry among Getachew, the TPLF and the regional administration (seen as TPLF-aligned) has in turn accentuated political fragmentation in Tigray. Notably, a rift has opened between the interim administration and the Southern Tigray zone – a stronghold for Getachew, who hails from the area. An attempt by the interim administration in August to replace the local authorities in Southern Tigray triggered clashes between residents and security forces in major towns, leading to the deaths of several people.

This political rift has also emboldened an embryonic armed opposition group – the Tigray Peace Forces (TPF, known as Hara Meret in Tigrinya) – that split from the TDF earlier in 2025 and is active in the lands connecting Tigray to the Afar region. 42 The group, which allegedly receives support from the federal government, has clashed with the TDF on several occasions. 43 In early November, TPF-TDF skirmishes on the Tigray-Afar boundary reportedly prompted the federal government to carry out drone strikes on TDF units, which it claims had crossed into Afar territory. 44

As for Tigray and Eritrea, the true depth of their current relationship is difficult to gauge. Senior TPLF members had previously admitted to meeting with the Eritrean regime, including in Asmara, but they now deny that such close ties exist. 45 Some observers nonetheless suggest that the two sides have forged a military alliance to counter Ethiopia. Others believe it is more likely that they have a looser non-aggression pact. 46

More recently, the federal government has accused the TPLF of forging an alliance with the Amhara Fano, including providing military advice to the militias and acting as a conduit for weapons and ammunition from Eritrea to the groups. 47 Improbable as this charge may seem, given how fiercely the Tigrayans and Amhara fought in the 2020-2022 war, it does seem likely that the TPLF and certain Fano groups have piloted local arrangements with sympathetic TDF commanders, particularly in areas of Amhara such as Wollo, which borders southern Tigray. That said, the lack of a cohesive Fano organisation, despite efforts to centralise command structures, makes a more consolidated partnership unlikely, while many in Amhara harbour deep mistrust of Tigray and Eritrea due to past antagonism. 48

Beyond the issue of military alliances, a more general rapprochement between Tigray and Eritrea, known as tsimdo (meaning “engagement” in Tigrinya), does appear to be under way. The border also opened temporarily at a number of locations. 49 In early October 2025, the TPLF released a carefully worded statement expressing its “appreciation and support for … people-to-people relations” and declaring its “commitment to contribute our share to elevate [them] to greater heights”. 50

As relations between Tigray and Eritrea have apparently grown closer, Prime Minister Abiy has responded by stoking bilateral tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara. He has doubled down on his plan to acquire a seaport, preferably on the Red Sea. In early September 2025, Abiy stated that the loss of the Red Sea, which “was in our hands 30 years ago … will be corrected” – giving rise to widespread speculation that he may be planning a military operation to acquire Assab. 51 In a parliamentary address in late October, Abiy openly questioned the legitimacy of Eritrea’s secession, claiming that no official record of it exists, thereby implying that it was illegal. 52

Alongside the bellicose rhetoric, Addis Ababa is beginning to engage with the Eritrean political and armed opposition based outside the country. Since early 2025, Ethiopia has openly hosted Brigade N’hamedu (Blue Revolution), a group that aims to overthrow the Eritrean regime. Abiy has also strengthened the federal government’s alliances in Ethiopia’s Afar region, which borders the narrow strip of southern Eritrea where Assab lies along the coast. Ethiopia is also now hosting an Afari nationalist armed group, which lays claim to southern Eritrea, including Assab. 53 (The Afari people are spread among north-eastern Ethiopia, southern Eritrea and northern Djibouti.) 54

At the same time, the federal government appears devoted to upgrading its military, including by recruiting more troops and expanding Ethiopia’s capacity to produce ammunition and drones, as well as by importing more drones and aircraft from outside the country. 55 While such activities are not surprising on their own – given the military’s battered state after the Tigray war, as well as the number of insurgencies it is now fighting – some worry that Ethiopia is amassing stockpiles for a larger conflict. 56

V. Weighing Conflict Risks

With relations among Addis Ababa, Asmara and the TPLF coming under huge strain, all sides have engaged in perilous shows of provocation. There are reasons to hope that none of the main players in a potential conflict – the Ethiopian federal government, Eritrea and the TPLF – is prepared to go to war in the immediate future. But equally, the flare-up of fighting between the TDF and federal forces in the disputed Tselemti area (see below) indicates that the region remains a tinderbox. The TPLF and Ethiopian federal authorities appear primed to test each other’s resolve. Either could edge toward the use of force despite the dangers it could entail.

Despite his belligerent rhetoric, Abiy may still be reluctant to launch a new war in Tigray. Fighting the TPLF again in its challenging home mountainous terrain is a forbidding prospect, no matter how depleted the Tigrayan forces. Ethiopia’s armed forces have also been stretched thin by fighting insurgents in the Amhara and Oromia regions. 57 Another war would consume resources that a cash-strapped Ethiopia can ill afford and might draw in Eritrea, too, either directly or through military support for the Tigrayans. For these reasons, Abiy may prefer to keep undermining the TPLF for the time being, by asphyxiating Tigray through economic restrictions and political destabilisation, including backing for opposition groups.

Likewise, Abiy has cause to doubt the wisdom of attempting a military campaign in Eritrea. First, the Ethiopian top brass appear uncertain as to whether the armed forces could achieve the objectives set for them, fearing they might become bogged down in an exhausting conflict against a dogged opponent. 58 An attack on Assab would leave Ethiopia dangerously exposed on other fronts, including the long boundary between Tigray and other regions, particularly given the rapprochement between the TPLF and Eritrea as well as Eritrean support for the Amhara Fano militias. Secondly, Abiy may fear the reaction of international partners, particularly the U.S. and European countries. Their support is essential for the continuation of Ethiopia’s IMF program, which in turn is integral to the government’s efforts to shore up the ailing economy. 59 A war with Eritrea would also likely scare away the foreign investors whom Abiy is courting.

Eritrea is also pursuing a generally cautious approach, ensuring that its military is entrenched in strategic border areas. Given the disparity between the size and strength of the Ethiopian and Eritrean armed forces – the former dwarfs the latter – it is unlikely that Asmara would attempt a pre-emptive strike, which could also backfire, providing Abiy with a perfect excuse to attack Eritrea. 60 For now, Isaias seems to be focused on nurturing relationships with Ethiopian opposition groups – notably the TPLF and Fano – as a means of overstretching and unsettling Addis Ababa. Asmara has used the same strategy with other Ethiopian opposition groups since the 1998-2000 border war, though it poses the risk for Eritrea of provoking Addis Ababa into a military riposte.

Finally, the TDF, which lost many fighters and much of its heavy weaponry during the last war, and whose numbers have been further thinned by partial demobilisation since then, has for the most part appeared loath to launch a military campaign that would bring it into sustained confrontation with federal forces. 61 The TPLF’s support base in Tigray has eroded, particularly since the party has become consumed by infighting. Local people also show little appetite for more fighting, making mass recruitment for a new war with the federal authorities far more challenging. 62

That said, displays of bravado on all sides raise the threat that a new conflict could be stirred. The TPLF leadership still seems to believe that an attack on Western Tigray (Welkait), which would bring it into direct confrontation with federal forces and Amhara militias deployed there, is an option. 63 There are signs that the TDF is considering this move, including a late January operation to seize control of the Tselemti district, which is also disputed with the Amhara region. 64 The TDF clashed sporadically with federal forces for several days, occupying parts of the area. 65 While some federal troops chose to withdraw rather than fight the TDF, the government responded robustly, immediately cancelling flights to Tigray and reportedly carrying out drone strikes on TPLF targets in other parts of the region. 66 In early February, the federal government also appeared to move part of its military previously deployed in the Amhara region closer to the boundary with Tigray. 67

Amid this uncertainty, the Ethiopian federal government seems to be weighing its options. Despite strong reasons for restraint, top officials still appear to be open to a major military strike on the TPLF or Eritrea. 68 Neither Mekelle nor Asmara may want to start a full-scale war, but so long as the tensions with Addis Ababa continue to heighten, the danger is that a sudden move by any side could escalate at high speed. The unsettled status quo, involving the unresolved political status of Tigray, support for proxy groups from all sides and frequent angry diplomatic exchanges between Ethiopia and Eritrea, suggests that the pretexts and possible triggers of conflict are many.

Bad blood between Abiy and the TPLF over Tigray will continue to rankle in various ways. The federal elections scheduled to take place by June 2026 could be a hazardous moment, since the TPLF is barred from taking part. Given the group’s control of Tigray’s interim administration and forces, staging an election in the region would be impossible without the party’s cooperation. In the absence of a deal to re-register the TPLF with the electoral authorities, which at present seems unlikely, a more plausible scenario is that national polls take place without Tigray’s involvement.

An attempt by the TPLF to stage its own elections, with the goal of seating a new regional government to replace the interim administration, would be especially dangerous. It is unclear whether Abiy, in that event, would decide to assume federal control of Tigray or leave it be as a rogue region outside the federal system. The last such dispute over Tigrayan elections offers a worrying precedent: the TPLF’s decision to push ahead with regional polls in September 2020, which the government had postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, triggered a rapid escalation toward war in November that year.

On the Ethiopia-Eritrea front, two issues give cause for alarm. First, Asmara’s strategy of partnering with groups in conflict with the Ethiopian federal government – whether the Fano, TPLF or others – could backfire if Addis Ababa considers Eritrea’s interference to have reached intolerable levels. It also makes rapprochement between the neighbouring states difficult unless Eritrea can persuade Ethiopia that it has ceased its support for proxy groups. Secondly, as mentioned above, Ethiopia appears to have been making preparations for war, with a number of senior officers in the military and intelligence services working full-time to coordinate the government’s strategy toward Eritrea. 69 The steady stream of accusations against Asmara can also be seen as laying out a justification for military action against Eritrea, as well as building up public support for a future offensive.

Furthermore, Abiy is showing no sign of backing down from his ambition of restoring Ethiopia’s toehold on the Red Sea, which he appears to view as a pillar of his eventual legacy. In a speech to the Ethiopian parliament in early February, Abiy referred to Ethiopia’s lack of access to the Red Sea as “[un]natural”, adding that “the Red Sea and Ethiopia cannot remain eternally apart”. 70 Abiy’s routes to regaining sea access by peaceful means do not look promising, raising fears he will resort to aggression despite the strong motives for restraint. Indeed, in his appearance in parliament he said, “when Ethiopians are provoked and attacked, it is inevitable that we will cause problems, not only on our own land but also in the land they call theirs” – seemingly a thinly veiled threat of action against Eritrea. 71

Any effort to stave off conflict by mediating between Eritrea and Ethiopia is sure to face major obstacles. To start with, Eritrea has so far rejected direct mediation without preconditions on the sea access question, believing that Ethiopia is trying to bully it into making concessions. Furthermore, Eritrea is highly isolated on the international stage, as its authoritarian regime has few powerful friends. Even fewer outside actors have close ties with both Asmara and Addis Ababa, and some of those that do may prize their relationship with Addis Ababa above the other because of Ethiopia’s economic and political clout. As a result, Asmara distrusts the neutrality of many would-be mediators. Even if those immediate mediation challenges were overcome, it remains unlikely that Ethiopia and Eritrea could find much common ground on the core issues dividing them, whether Eritrea’s meddling inside Ethiopia or Ethiopia’s hopes of regaining its coastline.

VI. Preventing a New War

Tensions among the potential belligerents in Tigray, Addis Ababa and Asmara are high, as mistrust between the sides festers and potential flashpoints proliferate. Foreign powers with influence in the Horn should pay heed to the threat and look for ways to curb the risks of further escalation before it is too late.

The first step should be to develop back channels among all the main players that could help ensure conflict triggers are managed peacefully. The brokers of the peace agreement between the federal government and the TPLF – Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria – should endeavour to re-engage both sides under the aegis of the African Union. 72 Rather than attempting to solve all the thorny problems surrounding the agreement, their objective should be to prevent the rapid unwinding of an already fragile peace. Approaches could include kindling talks between Addis Ababa and more pragmatic leaders in Mekelle, including Tadesse Werede, head of the regional administration. Key areas to focus on are preventing escalation of the clashes between the TPLF and the breakaway TPF militia, backed by the Ethiopian federal government; deterring further military action by the TPLF in territories disputed with the Amhara region; and stopping the build-up of proxy forces by Addis Ababa and Asmara.

Another focus should be the path to the 2026 federal elections. In the absence of a deal allowing the TPLF to re-register as a political party, and by extension participate in a vote, the two sides should seek to settle on a pragmatic compromise. A continuation of the administrative status quo in Tigray – through another extension of the interim administration’s mandate – appears the most realistic option, given the huge political barriers to holding polls in the region that would be recognised by the federal government.

A diplomatic back channel could also be useful in enabling Addis Ababa to convey to Tigrayan authorities what it regards as the acceptable limits to their relationship with Eritrea. The federal government could signal that it is prepared to accept continuation of the tsimdo cross-border cultural rapprochement, while drawing the line at an Eritrean military presence inside Tigray and deepening military contacts between the TPLF and Asmara.

Foreign involvement could also help manage tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Relations between the two capitals are now steeped in acrimony. To dilute the ill-will, outside powers should aim to provide space for discussions that could help avert the most disastrous outcomes. Major powers, including the U.S., the EU and its member states, China, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, should reiterate that they reject any attempt by either side to use military force against the other, even if indirectly, and that any further move toward war will badly damage the international standing of the party that makes it. As for Ethiopia, foreign powers with influence over the IMF and World Bank, particularly the U.S. and European states, should make clear that a grab for the port of Assab would force them to reconsider support from these institutions. 73 They should also stress their recognition of both Ethiopian and Eritrean sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the terms of the Algiers Agreement, which ended the last Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and the findings of the 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 74

There are several parties whose intervention could help turn down the temperature in different ways. Saudi Arabia, which sits across the Red Sea from Eritrea, is a major diplomatic power in the region, and is already discreetly engaging both sides, including on the risks of a conflict. 75 Despite scaling back its presence in the Horn of Africa in recent years, the U.S. is also trying to deter military action, particularly through private warnings to Ethiopia. It has the diplomatic muscle to influence Addis Ababa. 76 The EU, especially in conjunction with Italy, which has cultivated friendly relations with both Addis Ababa and Asmara, can transmit the same message. 77 China, which has major investments in Ethiopia and in Eritrea’s mining sector as well a military base in neighbouring Djibouti, would have much to lose from a war and could throw its weight behind preventing one. Finally, the UN, whose special envoy for the Horn is based in Addis Ababa, should continue playing a coordinating role, bringing interested parties together.

In the near term, these foreign powers should work to secure commitments from Addis Ababa that it will not resort to direct military confrontation to secure its objectives; and from Asmara that it will cease its proxy activities within Ethiopia. Nearby states, especially Djibouti, Somalia (and breakaway Somaliland), Eritrea and Kenya, could in turn encourage Ethiopia to seek credible ways of satisfying the country’s legitimate desire for improved sea access. They should redouble efforts to diversify the number of seaports available for Ethiopian use and improve the infrastructure needed to reach them. 78 While Addis Ababa’s ambitions to become a Red Sea power would remain unfulfilled, these steps would demonstrate that Ethiopia’s neighbours are taking its concerns seriously, especially its search for affordable, diversified, secure and reliable outlets for maritime commerce.

VII. Conclusion

Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray are at risk of descending into a new conflict only four years after the region’s last major conflagration ended. While all sides appear wary of igniting a new war, simmering grievances, overblown rhetoric and military preparations indicate that they are readying themselves for that eventuality. Recent skirmishes between Tigrayan and federal forces, which triggered a response from Addis Ababa involving drone strikes on TPLF targets, illustrate how local flare-ups could set a wider fight in motion. If that were to happen, Eritrea could be drawn into an interstate conflict.

Such a catastrophic turn of events is by no means inevitable. But without concerted regional and international action aimed at curbing tensions, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigray could find themselves party to a new regional war that would prove difficult to contain or end. Every effort should be made to avert it.

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 February 2026 https://www.crisisgroup.org/brf/africa/ethiopia-eritrea/b210-ethiopia-eritrea-and-tigray-powder-keg-horn-africa

The prosperous regime was reveling in its followers, known as "Media Army," with six F-16 fighter jets and six AH-64 Apache helicopters belonging to the United Arab Emirates Air Force, as well as drones rented from China for $120,000 for 10 minutes, proclaiming "the sky is ours."

The report states that while the Abiy Ahmed Prosperity Group was falsely claiming that “the sky is ours” with its fighter jets and rented drones, the Sudanese government forces led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan violated Ethiopian airspace and carried out an attack in the Benishangul Gumuz region . The airstrikes targeted Hemeti Rapid Support Forces (RSF) soldiers who had established military bases in the Benishangul Gumuz region and bordering Sudan with the approval of the Abiy regime, killing many and wounding hundreds, according to our military sources.

Military sources said that these wounded soldiers of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are being treated at the Eastern Command Level 3 Hospital in Dire Dawa city. These Hemet Rapid Support Forces (RSF) soldiers are being treated separately from the Eastern Command soldiers who were injured in the war in the Amhara region and are being sent to Dire Dawa due to overcrowding in hospitals.

“The Eastern Command soldiers who were wounded in the war in the Amhara region and are being treated at this hospital are only served food once a day, while the members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are served nutritious meals prepared by selected chefs every hour,” our sources told us. Many members of the Eastern Command’s defence forces, frustrated by this, have left the hospital without recovering from their wounds and have disappeared. The Hospital is owned by the ENDF Eastern Command, located in the Cuba military camp in Dire Dawa city,Ethiopia.

The camp constitutes the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule. It has spread famine and been marked by racially-charged atrocities. Millions of refugees have fled to Egypt, Chad, Libya and South Sudan.

Both sides draw strength from international backers, fueling the war and increasing the risk that the fighting spills over into neighbouring countries.

The news agency spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp’s construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

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The insular but strategically positioned Red Sea country of Eritrea is coming under the radar of Arab capitals as a potential linchpin in Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Red Sea rivalry.

Two Arab officials familiar with recent diplomacy told Middle East Eye that Egypt is trying to broker deeper security links between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia, with an eye towards checking the UAE’s influence as it increases military ties to Ethiopia.

The Arab officials told MEE that the developments are inspired by a defence deal struck between Sudan’s military and Pakistan in January. That agreement is widely understood to be financed by Saudi Arabia, although the weapons systems have yet to materialise.

MEE reported that Pakistani chief of air staff Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, and Lieutenant General Turki bin Bander bin Abdulaziz of the Royal Saudi Air Force negotiated the deal on behalf of army chief Abdul Fattah al-Burhan.

The three-way diplomacy underscores the complex and shifting alliances rippling across the Red Sea.

At one time, both Eritrea and Egypt were seen as particularly close to the UAE. Ties between Cairo and Abu Dhabi are not at rock bottom, but have become strained over Sudan’s civil war and Gaza.

Likewise, Eritrea, which has been ruled by former guerrilla leader President Isaias Afwerki since its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, was once aligned with the UAE.

Egypt and Eritrea try to entice Saudi Arabia

Eritrea served as a hub for the UAE’s military operations in Yemen. But the UAE dismantled its base on the Red Sea port of Assab in 2021 and more recently has forged a close military partnership with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s arch-rival.

“Supporting Eritrea makes sense from Egypt’s regional security perspective, but it has financial constraints, so if they can bring the Saudis in, who have significant financial resources, that’s in their interests,” Michael Woldemariam, an expert on the Horn of Africa and Eritrea at the University of Maryland, told MEE.

‘Egypt is trying to plug the gaps, of which Eritrea is definitely one’

- Mirette Mabrouk, Middle East Institute

“Of course, the Eritreans don’t need to be pushed by the Egyptians to embrace the Saudis. It’s been Asmara’s objective for some time,” he added.

The reclusive Afwerki has governed Eritrea with a tight grip since independence.

Eritrea was once an Italian colony. It fought a decades-long insurgency against Addis Ababa. The conflict was touched on by African writers such as Baalu Girma in his novel Oromay, which centres on the communist Derg government, but in the West, it is a largely forgotten Cold War conflict.

During the Cold War, Eritrean fighters courted Gulf states for support, with Egypt serving as a hub for Eritrean fighters.

“The relationship between Eritrea and Egypt is very deep and very old,” Martin Plaut, an expert on the Horn of Africa and author of Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State, told MEE.

MEE was told by the Arab officials that Afwerki discussed bolstering security ties with the Saudi Arabians during his four-day visit to the kingdom in December 2025. The 80-year-old former leader is viewed as a steely negotiator.

In 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia ended a bitter border dispute. Afwerki met his Ethiopian counterpart, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who later received a Nobel Prize for his diplomacy. Then in 2022, Eritrea fought on the side of Ahmed’s government in the brutal Ethiopian civil war that saw up to 600,000 people killed.

Now, tensions are once again running high between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the latter accusing Asmara of arming rebel groups.

“Isaias is especially good at navigating these kinds of dynamics,” Plaut told MEE, regarding the shifting alliances in Africa and the Gulf.

“You essentially have two axes now: the Saudi and the Emirati. The Eritreans are now clearly with the former,” he added.

Shifting Gulf alliances

For Egypt, bolstering the Eritreans is part of its efforts to check Ethiopia, whose Grand Renaissance Dam project is viewed in Cairo as a major threat to national security. Ethiopia officially inaugurated the dam in September 2025.

The existing tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt have been turbocharged by Addis Ababa’s closer security cooperation with the UAE over Sudan.

‘The Eritreans don’t need to be pushed by the Egyptians to embrace the Saudis’

- Michael Woldemariam, University of Maryland

MEE has revealed that Emirati personnel once deployed in Somalia have redeployed to Ethiopia, which, according to multiple sources, including a former Ethiopian government adviser, is now crucial to the UAE’s strategy in the region.

Throughout January, Emirati aircraft, including one dubbed the world’s largest military transport aircraft, have been recorded flying into Ethiopia, including Harar Meda Airport, the main base of the Ethiopian Air Force.

Experts tell MEE that Abu Dhabi is likely relying on Ethiopia to supply the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia back the Sudanese military against the RSF. The nasty public rupture in ties between Saudi Arabia and the UAE became public shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman lobbied the US against the UAE over Sudan. MEE was the first to reveal the lobbying campaign.

‘Eyeing drone defences’

“The Egyptians are keen to support the Eritreans for the most bleeding obvious reason, what Ethiopia has done to the Nile Dam,” Plaut told MEE.

“The Eritreans need new equipment. They have been fighting several wars. And they are very worried about the Ethiopian drones,” he added.

“Eritrea only has three sources of cash: peasant taxes, mining and a two percent diaspora tax,” he added. “So they need Saudi money.”

‘The Eritreans need new equipment. They are very worried about the Ethiopian drones’

- Martin Plaut, author of Understanding Eritrea

Mirette Mabrouk, the director of the Egypt programme at the Middle East Institute, told MEE that Egypt’s efforts to lobby for a security deal underscore a “proactive” tilt in Cairo’s approach to the Red Sea.

Egypt has put pressure on its ally, Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, to stop supplying the RSF with fuel and weapons. The New York Times reported that Egypt is hosting Turkish drones for use against the RSF.

“Egypt is trying to plug the gaps [in security challenges against the UAE], of which Eritrea is definitely one,” Mabrouk told MEE.

The challenge for Asmara and Cairo will be moving from this loose alliance into a framework for deliverables, experts and diplomats tell MEE. The Sudan-Pakistan deal is an example of the challenges.

There have been no public reports of Pakistani arms moving to Burhan’s forces yet. Sources familiar with the talks told MEE that Saudi Arabia, which has domestic economic needs, has been reluctant to fully commit despite the overtures from Cairo and Asmara.

Levent Kamal contributed to this report.

Middle East Eye delivers independent and unrivalled coverage and analysis of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond.

The move altered the political equation along one of the world’s most sensitive maritime routes. In Hargeisa, it was seen as a long-awaited validation. In Addis Ababa, it opened a new strategic space. In Beijing, Ankara, Cairo, and Riyadh, it raised immediate concern.

It consolidates a four-party alignment linking Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia. This emerging axis centers on securing maritime chokepoints in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab, while laying the groundwork for an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in eastern Africa.

The timing followed months of escalating regional pressure. The Israeli–Iranian confrontation in June 2025, along with the Yemeni maritime blockade targeting vessels bound for Israeli ports, exposed the vulnerability of southern sea lanes.

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On January 26, the army recaptured positions in the Blue Nile province of Bau from the grip of a coalition that includes the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Popular Movement, a day after the coalition took control of them, as its forces launched from inside South Sudan.

The SPLM-Shamal, led by Abdulaziz al-Helou, announced control of the strategic city of Dim Mansour, in addition to Bashir Nugo and Khor al-Budi in al-Karmak province, following battles with the Sudanese army.

The group said on its Facebook platform that it had seized combat vehicles, tanks and drones during the attack on these sites.

It is noteworthy that “Dim Mansour” is one of the strategic towns whose fall is feared to pave the way for the army’s loss of the city of Karmuk, as it was attacked, according to reliable sources, by a large force for hours continuously, accompanied by drone attacks, which destroyed the army’s ammunition stores and cars.

Videos broadcast by the SPLM showed what it said were army defences in the areas it had claimed control, as well as heavy artillery inside a trench.

The military has not commented on the developments.

The governor of Karmak, Abdulati Mohamed al-Faki, said on Tuesday that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Popular Movement had launched an attack on army garrisons in the province, including Dim Mansour and Khor al-Budi, and that the army was responding to them.

A senior government official who spoke to Sudan Tribune accused Ethiopia of involvement in this escalation by facilitating the passage of the Rapid Support Forces and the Popular Movement, which he said launched from inside Ethiopian territory and attacked army positions in Kurmak province

He said that more than three days ago, military intelligence monitored the infiltration of groups of the Rapid Support Forces and the Popular Movement, which were stationed in the Bani Shangul-Qomz region of Ethiopia, and crossed the border at the “Yabus” area in the Blue Nile region.

The drones that attacked the army’s defenses today in the Blue Nile region were launched from bases supervised by the United Arab Emirates in the Bani Shangul-Qomz region, he said.

The official stressed that the army is capable of protecting the border and defeating what he described as a “foreign invasion backed by Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates.”

In June, the Sudanese army was able to drive the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies away from areas of Blue Nile, where they withdrew under the pressure of military attacks to areas adjacent to the borders with Ethiopia and South Sudan.

اشتعال جبهة النيل الأزرق ومسؤول يتهم إثيوبيا بالتورط - سودان تربيون

His colleagues and professional peers said they did not know the reason why the security forces targeted him.

They say the security personnel arrived in a coordinated manner under the guise of receiving guests from the Federal Health Bureau. They forcibly detained him, and took him away in a vehicle for interrogation.

The search took place around 9:00 a.m. Afterwards the security forces took Dr. Tsegahun away from the Bezaweit area of Bahir Dar city. Sources said that Dr. Tsegahun was held in custody and killed after approximately four hours.

The security personnel returned to his house after the interrogation. People who knew Dr. Tsegahun well—his colleagues and family friends—confirmed this account. It isn’t clear what the security forces found or were looking for during the house search. They seized a laptop and all mobile phones belonging to the homeowner.

After the killing, they reportedly returned to the house and instructed the family to take their belongings.

The family confirmed that they received Dr. Tsegahun’s body and described the incident as a clear case of targeted violence. This has increasingly been carried out by security forces.

Commentators say that over the past two years, several young health Amhara professionals have been killed. After being apprehended by security forces, many are reportedly found the next morning with their hands tied behind their backs in various parts of the city.

Washington recognizes that a regional war would be disastrous for its Red Sea policy and would undermine U.S. interests in counterterrorism, maritime security, and containing Iran. That’s one reason it agreed to help bring Sudan’s war to an end and recently dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to visit the Horn of Africa. But to achieve this, the Trump administration now needs to draw its own red lines with the UAE to ensure that the region’s newest power doesn’t recklessly widen the war.

READ MORE : https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/27/sudan-united-arab-emirates-saudi-arabia-ethiopia-trump-red-sea/

By Cameron Hudson, a former State Department and National Security Council official on Africa, and Liam Karr, a the Africa Team Lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/27/sudan-united-arab-emirates-saudi-arabia-ethiopia-trump-red-sea/

The following quote is taken from an interview of Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) Belay Zeleke Command Dagmawi Tewodrose (5th) Corps Gondere Begashaw Division Public Relations Head Arbegna Tadlo Dessie (Kastiro) with French digital newspaper Mediapart.

“Our enthusiasm is greater than that of the army, made up of soldiers who were forcibly recruited, including children. The Fano, by contrast, fight for their freedom and for the freedom of the people,”

Since August 2023, fighting has been raging in the Amhara region. The clashes, which primarily affect rural areas, have intensified in recent months. In Gondar, government forces are accused of numero ……. READ MORE https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/261225/ils-ont-tout-brule-au-nord-de-l-ethiopie-le-conflit-entre-le-pouvoir-central-et-les-milices-des-fan

On 19 January at a policy forum titled ‘Financing Ethiopia’s Future’, Abiy called for decisive action against ‘ethnic hatred, discrimination, and marginalisation’ which were holding Ethiopia back. Yet it is his policies that are widely seen as promoting divisions across the country’s regions and among its more than 135 million people. Oppositionists make progress on a unity deal as insurgents tighten their grip on Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia …. READ MORE Africa Confidential

As a result of these compounding crises, Ethiopia features on the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Emergency Watchlist as one of the countries most likely to experience a worsening humanitarian crisis in 2026.

Learn more about the crisis in Ethiopia and what you can do to help.

What is driving the crisis in Ethiopia?

Multiple, overlapping crises are converging across Ethiopia. Armed conflict in several regions continues to uproot families and disrupt daily life, while years of strain have weakened health services, food systems and other essential infrastructure.

At the same time, new outbreaks of violence are pushing families from their homes, increasing hunger and disease risk—especially for children. These pressures are now being compounded by steep reductions in humanitarian funding, creating a widening gap between growing needs and shrinking assistance.

Support our response

The IRC is delivering humanitarian aid in Ethiopia and crisis zones around the world.

Tensions rise again in Ethiopia’s Tigray region

Northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region is at risk of renewed violence, after a brutal civil war devastated communities. Fighting between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), backed by forces from neighboring Eritrea and Ethiopia’s Oromia region, killed and displaced hundreds of thousands of people between 2020 and 2022. Hospitals, schools, homes and businesses were destroyed, leaving communities struggling to recover.

Although a peace agreement formally ended the fighting in late 2022, it remains fragile. Split within the TPLF and rising tensions between the Ethiopian government and Eritrea regarding disputed border territory have brought the peace deal to the verge of collapse. Meanwhile, Tigray has experienced little reconstruction during this period and nearly 800,000 displaced people still reside in the region, living in dire conditions with limited access to basic services.

Any outburst of violence would have devastating consequences for civilians, who have yet to see meaningful reconstruction or recovery.

Birhe gave birth to her son Selam while displaced after fleeing violence in Tigray. Selam received a full course of routine vaccinations from the IRC.

Photo: Martha Tadesse for the IRC

Violence in Ethiopia’s largest region triggers displacement

Ethiopia’s Oromia region—the country’s largest and most populous—has seen a sharp rise in violence in recent years. Clashes between the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) and Ethiopian government have displaced more than 280,000 people from their homes in 2025.

Emergency levels of child malnutrition rates have been recorded as families flee violence with little more than they can carry. Because Oromia sits at the center of Ethiopia’s transport and food supply networks, insecurity in the region is also disrupting markets, livelihoods and the delivery of humanitarian aid nationwide.

Siblings Hiyab and Tsinat were displaced from their homes due to conflict and now attend a school supported by the IRC.

Photo: Derrick Taremwa for the IRC

Shortfalls in U.S. aid budgets cuts support for millions

Shortly after taking office in 2025, the Trump Administration slashed the U.S. humanitarian aid budget. Ethiopia lost $387 million in USAID funding—the largest funding cut affecting any country in Africa. The impact was immediate, straining public services and leading to the layoff of more than 5,000 health workers.

More than 2 million people missed out on food distributions in 2025, and an estimated 3.6 million could lose access to aid without an immediate increase in funding. An estimated 650,000 women and children are also at risk of losing access to malnutrition treatment, including in regions where child malnutrition has reached emergency levels.

Emergency levels of child malnutrition rates were recorded across several Ethiopian regions in 2025.

Photo: Fahmo Mohammed for the IRC

Climate shocks compound risk

Ethiopia is still reeling from a multi-year drought that affected 30 million people between 2020-2023, undermining food security and devastating pastoral livelihoods as livestock deaths surged. While improved rainfall has reduced the immediate threat of drought, many communities lack the support needed to recover.

This already dire situation could be further compounded by new waves of flooding linked to the global La Niña weather pattern, which threatens food stocks and risks worsening a cholera outbreak that has already affected more than 6,800 people.

Tekley’s son, Kibrom, just received life-saving vaccines from the IRC in Tigray, Ethiopia.

Photo: Martha Tadesse for the IRC

How the IRC is responding in Ethiopia

The IRC began its operations in Ethiopia in 2000, providing support to refugees from neighboring countries as well as Ethiopians living in crisis-affected and underserved communities. The country continues to face recurring challenges, including conflict, natural hazards and climatic shocks, all of which disproportionately affect vulnerable populations. We respond through multi-sectoral programming in health and nutrition, child protection, education, women’s protection and empowerment, economic recovery and development, and environmental health.

How to help people affected by the crisis in Ethiopia?

You can help families in Ethiopia survive, recover and rebuild. The IRC relies on generous donors to deliver lifesaving food, health care, education, and protection services in some of the country’s most vulnerable communities.

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Source : rescue.org

They said Egypt’s latest move in the Horn of Africa nation reflected fears that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland last month could give it a foothold in a region that Cairo sees as vital to its national security.

The Egyptian government is also alarmed that Israel could use any influence it gains in Somaliland to forge an axis with Ethiopia, another Horn of Africa nation, with which Cairo has been locked in a years-long dispute over Nile waters, said the sources, who are briefed on Egypt’s policies there

Military analyst Samir Ragheb, a retired army brigadier, said: “Somaliland is perhaps the most strategic part of Somalia. It can potentially be used to hinder our [Egypt’s] access to the Red Sea through its southern mouth,” referring to the region that sits on the Gulf of Aden and near the Bab Al Mandeb strait, the Red Sea’s southern gateway.

“The whole of Horn of Africa is of vital national security interest to Egypt. If Israel gets a foothold in Somaliland, its next step could be undermining or overthrowing Somalia’s government and securing access to the Red Sea for landlocked Ethiopia.”

Egypt has more than 2,000km of Red Sea coastline. It has repeatedly voiced strong opposition to landlocked nations such as Ethiopia gaining a foothold in the Red Sea, the main maritime link between Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

Somalia has strongly condemned Israel’s recognition of Somaliland – the first by any country since the region broke away from Somalia in 1991 – arguing that it constituted a breach of its sovereignty. Mogadishu had similarly reacted to a preliminary deal struck in 2024 between Somaliland and Ethiopia to grant the latter access to the Red Sea.

In a bid to pressure Ethiopia to show more flexibility in their water dispute, Egypt has in recent years built up bilateral alliances and trust with countries such as Somalia, Djibouti – both fellow members of the Arab League – Eritrea and Kenya, while offering technical expertise in a range of fields to many of the 11 Nile Basin nations.

More recently, Egypt has reached agreements to upgrade the port of Doraleh in Djibouti, as well as Eritrea’s strategic Red Sea port of Assab, to increase their capacity and create berths for its own warships, sources and the Egyptian government have said.

Egypt began posting troops and military advisers in Somalia in 2024 after the two nations signed a defence agreement. It has also provided Somalia with weapons and counterterrorism advisers to aid its fight against terrorist group Al Shabab. It also intends to take part in a new African Union peacekeeping mission in the country.

Egypt’s contingent in Somalia is believed to number around 10,000 men, according to the sources.

“Egypt fully supports the unity, integrity and security of Somalia’s territory,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty told his Somali counterpart Abdel Salam Abdy when they met on Saturday on the side lines of an Organisation of Islamic Co-operation meeting in Saudi Arabia.

“Egypt absolutely rejects and condemns any unilateral actions or attempts to impose parallel entities or create a new political reality outside internationally recognised legal frameworks,” he said.

He also emphasised what he called Egypt’s commitment to the “support of Somalia’s institutions and efforts to ensure security and stability, especially in counterterrorism and combating extremism”.

The sources said Cairo responded to Israel’s move by adjusting the goals of its military and security mission in Somalia, an impoverished Afro-Arab nation with ancient ties to Egypt.

The adjustment included a redeployment of Egypt’s contingent to align with the new goals, said the sources. They gave no details.

“The implementation on the ground of the joint defence agreement between Egypt and Somalia has expanded and deepened since Israel’s recognition of Somaliland,” said one of the sources.

“Now, ensuring the survival of the state of Somalia and its current regime is a top objective. If the state falls or becomes unhinged as a result of outside pressure, Egypt will not be able to remain there,” added the source, who warned against potential schemes by Israel and Ethiopia to undermine or topple the Mogadishu government, whose relations with Addis Ababa have been tense.

“Egypt does not want Somalia to fall prey to Israel, Ethiopia or any other foreign power,” said the source.

Egypt’s concern over Israel’s potentially disruptive influence in the Horn of Africa comes at a time when relations between the two Middle East neighbours are at their lowest ebb since 1979, when they signed a peace treaty after fighting four full-blown wars between 1948 and 1973.

Israel’s war in Gaza, which also borders Egypt, has been the main point of contention between the two nations, with Cairo accusing Israel of genocide and intentionally starving the enclave’s two million Palestinians.

However, Michael Hanna, a New York-based Middle East expert with the International Crisis Group, played down the tension over Somaliland, dismissing the possibility it could boil over into violent confrontation.

“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is part of its old-school doctrine of courting minorities and non-Arabs in the region,” he said. “The Israelis are happy to deal with small entities to undermine the bigger ones.

“Somaliland is just one more layer in the differences between Egypt and Israel, whose cold peace has endured for decades. With all the tension between them, there has been no rupture in their relations.”

But the sources disagree, contending that Israel’s efforts to forge close ties with Horn of Africa and Nile Basin nations pose a serious threat to Egypt’s national security at a time when it is trying to pressure Ethiopia into entering a legally binding deal on the running of its giant Nile dam.

Egypt, they pointed out, has also been trying to persuade other Nile Basin nations to enter a collective agreement on the best use of the river’s water, while offering them technical help to achieve that goal.

Egypt depends on the Nile for almost all its freshwater. The nation of 108 million views any reduction in its share as an existential threat that could disrupt its delicate food balance and wipe out the livelihoods of millions of agricultural workers.

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